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PAVING THE DELAWARE WAY:  
LEGISLATIVE AND EQUITABLE  
LIMITS ON BYLAWS AFTER ATP 
MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN 
JOHN M. WUNDERLICH

 
ABSTRACT 
In ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, the Delaware Supreme 
Court held that a private company’s fee-shifting bylaw was facially valid. 
And before that decision, Delaware courts similarly upheld companies’ 
use of forum-selection bylaws requiring that intra-corporate disputes be 
litigated in a single designated forum. Many interpreted these holdings as 
broad endoresements of bylaws that could regulate the litigation process 
itself and a move by the Delaware courts to curtail shareholder litigation. 
Indeed, the Delaware legislature itself responded to ATP, amending the 
state’s corporate law to explicitly prohibit Delaware companies from 
adopting fee-shifting bylaws for shareholder litigation. But the legislature 
simultaneously allowed Delaware companies to adopt forum-selection 
bylaws.  
In this Article, we show that ATP and caselaw related to forum-
selection bylaws will not result in calamity for investors or provide a 
silver bullet for companies to end shareholder and securities litigation. 
Rather, when carefully and fairly read, these decisions simply reaffirm the 
Delaware Way, under which corporate managers are vested with broad 
legal authority, but that authority is tempered by principles of equity. 
Using ATP and fee-shifting bylaws as a point of departure, we provide a 
template for equitable analysis of not only fee-shifting bylaws, but also 
forum-selection bylaws and other bylaws relating to litigation. 
Furthermore, as we argue in this Article, had equitable principles been 
properly applied to fee-shifting bylaws, equitable principles would have 
likely prevented fee-shifting bylaws from extinguishing meritorious 
shareholder or securities litigation anyway. In fact, the only kind of fee-
shifting bylaw that would likely have survived equitable scrutiny is one 
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that already exists under Delaware’s Rule 11—one that provides that a 
neutral arbiter can approve of two-way shifting of reasonable fees in 
response to frivolous litigation. Ultimately, perhaps the most compelling 
case for legislation barring fee-shifting bylaws in other states that follow 
the Delaware Way is that doing so may spare litigants and the system the 
lengthy, common-law process that will likely arrive at the state of the law 
already in place.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, the Delaware Supreme 
Court held that a private company’s fee-shifting bylaw was facially valid.1 
That bylaw was especially wide-reaching. It applied to current 
shareholders, former shareholders, and anybody who assisted them in 
investigating or suing on their claim.
2
 It required fee shifting in any case 
where the plaintiffs obtained anything short of a full judgment in their 
favor or that differed from the relief initially sought in the complaint.
3
 And 
it shifted not just lawyers’ fees but costs of every kind.4  
Many have interpreted ATP as a broad endorsement of fee-shifting 
bylaws and a move by the Delaware courts to curtail shareholder 
litigation.
5
 Commentators have warned or celebrated (depending on their 
point of view) that ATP would permit public companies to adopt similar 
fee-shifting bylaws for all sorts of shareholder and securities lawsuits.
6
  
The prospect that companies organized in Delaware and elsewhere 
would race to adopt fee-shifting bylaws that apply to shareholder and 
securities litigation caused alarm. According to some, fee-shifting bylaws 
leave shareholder and securities litigation on the precipice of becoming 
“an empty threat”7 and “eviscerate[] investor rights.”8 According to others, 
fee-shifting bylaws “chill[] the assertion of meritless claims”9 and 
represent a “new weapon [in] . . . the corporate arsenal to deter shareholder 
litigation.”10  
 
 
 1. 91 A.3d 554, 558 (Del. 2014). 
 2. Id. at 556. 
 3.  Id. 
 4. Id.   
 5. See discussion infra Part II. 
 6. See discussion infra Part II. 
 7. Press Release, U.S. Senator Richard Blumenthal, Blumenthal Calls on SEC to Protect 
Critical Check on Corporate Malfeasance (Oct. 30, 2014), available at http://www.blumenthal. 
senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/blumenthal-calls-on-sec-to-protect-critical-check-on-corporate-
malfeasance, archived at http://perma.cc/E7MX-B24L (providing the text of a letter from Senator 
Blumenthal to Mary Jo White, Chairwoman of the SEC, regarding private citizen suits).  
 8. Hazel Bradford, Institutional Investors Team Up Against Delaware Court Ruling on Legal 
Fees, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (Dec. 3, 2014, 3:39 PM), http://www.pionline.com/article/2014 
1203/ONLINE/141209953/institutional-investors-team-up-against-delaware-court-ruling-on-legal-fees 
(quoting a letter sent to Delaware Governor Jack Markell by the National Conference on Public 
Employee Retirement Systems and eight unions representing public- and private-sector workers).  
 9. Herbert F. Kozlov & Lawrence J. Reina, Delaware Supreme Court Approves Fee-Shifting 
Bylaw for Non-Stock Corporations, BUS. L. TODAY (June 2014), http://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/publications/blt/2014/06/keeping-current-kozlov-201406.authcheckdam.pdf.  
 10. Gail O’Gradney, Let Us Let Bylaws Be Bylaws, 32 FLETCHER CORP. L. ADVISER, no. 7, July 
2014, at 3. 
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In response to these concerns, the Delaware legislature amended its 
corporate law to explicitly provide that “[t]he certificate of incorporation 
[or the Bylaws] may not contain any provision that would impose liability 
on a stockholder for the attorneys’ fees or expenses of the corporation or 
any other party in connection with an internal corporate claim . . . .”11 At 
the same time, the Delaware legislature also made clear that Delaware 
companies may adopt forum-selection bylaws.
12
 
In this Article, we show that the Delaware legislature’s decision to 
prohibit fee-shifting bylaws and to allow forum-selection bylaws is 
consistent with the equitable limits placed on any such bylaw under 
Delaware case law, including those articulated by ATP itself. ATP—when 
carefully and fairly read—simply reaffirms the “Delaware Way.”13 Under 
the Delaware Way, corporate managers are vested with broad legal 
authority, but that authority is tempered by principles of equity.
14
 
Likewise, in ATP, the Delaware Supreme Court held that even if fee-
shifting bylaws are facially valid, principles of equity limit their 
application.
15
 Those same principles of equity also limit the use of forum-
 
 
 11. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(f), 109(b) (2015). An “internal corporate claim” includes 
claims “in the right of the corporation, (i) that are based upon a violation of a duty by a current or 
former director or officer or stockholder in such capacity, or (ii) as to which this title confers 
jurisdiction upon the Court of Chancery.” Id. § 115. 
 12. Id. § 115 (stating that “[t]he certificate of incorporation or the bylaws may require, consistent 
with applicable jurisdictional requirements, that any or all internal corporate claims shall be brought 
solely and exclusively in any or all of the courts in this State, and no provision of the certificate of 
incorporation or the bylaws may prohibit bringing such claims in the courts of this State”). 
 13. For purposes of this Article, we assume that ATP’s “bylaws as contracts” theory for public 
companies holds true, see ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 558 (Del. 2014), 
that ATP’s holding may be extended to non-stock companies, and that federal law would not preempt 
the fee-shifting bylaw. These assumptions are significant as every one of them is an open question. See 
J. Robert Brown, Jr., Shifting Back the Focus: Fee Shifting Bylaws and a Need to Return to Legislative 
Intent, 53 BANK & CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REP. 2015, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2547094 
(arguing that bylaws of public companies are not contracts); John C. Coffee, Jr., Fee-Shifting Bylaw 
and Charter Provisions: Can They Apply in Federal Court?—The Case for Preemption (Columbia 
Law Sch. Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 498, 2014), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2508973 (making the case for federal preemption of fee-shifting bylaws in 
shareholder litigation); Hon. Henry duPont Ridgely, J., Sup. Ct. of Del., Keynote Address at the 22nd 
Annual SMU Corporate Counsel Symposium: The Emerging Role of Bylaws in Corporate Governance 
19 (Oct. 31, 2014), available at http://www.delawarelitigation.com/files/2014/11/The_Emerging_ 
Role_of_Bylaws_in_Corporate_Governance-copy.pdf (stating that whether ATP applies to for-profit 
companies is an “open question”); William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Intersection of Fee-Shifting Bylaws 
and Securities Fraud Litigation, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (making a case for federal 
preemption of fee-shifting bylaws in securities cases). 
 14. See discussion infra Part III. 
 15. See ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 558 (Del. 2014) (stating that 
bylaws, even though legally permissible, may not be enforceable depending on how they are adopted 
and invoked). 
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selection bylaws, despite the fact that the Delaware legislature has made 
explicit their facial validity.
16
 
Using ATP and fee-shifting bylaws as a point of departure, we provide 
a template for equitable analysis of not only fee-shifting bylaws, but also 
forum-selection bylaws and other bylaws relating to litigation. Further, as 
we argue in this Article, when equitable principles are properly applied, 
they will likely preclude the use of such bylaws to extinguish meritorious 
shareholder or securities litigation. As we demonstrate, before any court—
including those states that follow Delaware’s corporate law—will enforce 
a fee-shifting or forum-selection bylaw, the board of directors must meet 
its burden of proving that adopting and implementing that bylaw comports 
with its fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. Specifically, the only kind of 
fee-shifting bylaw that is likely to survive equitable scrutiny by any court 
following the Delaware Way is one that is balanced, or “proportionate”—
one that provides that a neutral arbiter can approve of two-way shifting of 
reasonable fees in response to frivolous litigation.  
Moreover, we find that the fee-shifting bylaws that will survive 
equitable review simply duplicate the existing mechanism for patrolling 
frivolous litigation: Rule 11. That Rule also provides for a neutral arbiter 
to approve of two-way shifting of reasonable fees in response to frivolous 
litigation. Ultimately, we demonstrate that the Delaware legislature’s 
decision to prohibit fee-shifting bylaws on their face avoids years of 
litigation surrounding fee-shifting to arrive at the state of the law already 
in place. Perhaps the most compelling reason for legislative intervention 
was to spare litigants and the system the lengthy, common-law process 
that would have gotten us to a world that already exists. 
II. PERCEIVING ATP AS PART OF THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO THE 
EXPLOSION OF DEAL LITIGATION 
There is nothing inherently objectionable about corporate deals.
17
 Yet 
lately, shareholder plaintiffs have challenged nearly every deal in court,
18
 
 
 
 16. See discussion infra Part III. 
 17. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 10 
(2010) (stating that mergers have the potential to “generate significant efficiencies,” “enhance the 
merged firm’s ability and incentive to compete,” “lower prices,” “improve[] quality,” “enhance[] 
service,” and create “new products”).  
 18. See, e.g., CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS: REVIEW OF 2013 M&A LITIGATION 1 (2014), available at https://www.cornerstone. 
com/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?guid=73882c85-ea7b-4b3c-a75f-40830eab34b6 (documenting the jump 
in the percentage of deals subject to lawsuits). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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claiming that the board sold the company for too little, refused to sell at a 
premium, or did something to affect the price adversely.
19
 Deal litigation is 
now so common that it has amounted to what some call “a feeding 
frenzy.”20 The number of deal challenges lends credence to this criticism. 
Specifically, in 2005, shareholders challenged only about half of all $100-
million deals in court, yet by 2010, shareholders were claiming that more 
than 90% of these deals were, in some way, unfair.
21
 A columnist for the 
New York Times reports that deal litigation is “a big issue these days 
because once you’ve announced a deal, you are likely to get sued. 
Really.”22  
The near-automatic litigation that accompanies deals has led to 
skepticism among academics and members of the bar concerning the 
worth of these lawsuits.
23
 Likewise, the Delaware judiciary has questioned 
 
 
 19. Deal litigation usually takes the form of a class action, and the fundamental claim in deal 
litigation is that the deal is, in some way, unfair because the board breached a fiduciary duty of care, 
good faith, or loyalty when it sold the company for too little, refused to sell at a premium, or did 
something that adversely affected price. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 
1983) (defining substantive fairness as involving issues of process and price); Jill E. Fisch et al., 
Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal 
for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557, 564 (2015); Randall S. Thomas, What Should We Do About 
Multijurisdictional Litigation in M&A Deals?, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1925, 1929 (2013). 
 20. See Steven Davidoff Solomon, Debating the Merits of the Boom in Merger Lawsuits, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 8, 2013, 3:50 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/debating-the-merits-of-the-
boom-in-merger-lawsuits/?_r=3; see also Phillip R. Sumpter, Adjusting Attorneys’ Fee Awards: The 
Delaware Court of Chancery’s Answer to Incentivizing Meritorious Disclosure-Only Settlements, 15 
U. PA. J. BUS. L. 669, 673 (2013) (describing the rise in deal litigation as “meteoric”).  
 21. See, e.g., Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Takeover Litigation in 2014 2 (Feb. 
20, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2567902 (finding that “[f]or 
the fourth year in a row over 90% of transactions experienced a lawsuit”); see also CORNERSTONE 
RESEARCH, supra note 18, at 1 (finding similar statistics); Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, 
Takeover Litigation in 2013 2 (Ohio State Univ. Moritz Coll. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory 
Working Paper Series, No. 236, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2377001 (demonstrating 
that in 2013, all but two of the large mergers studied were subject to litigation). 
 22. Solomon, supra note 20. Professor Thomas posits three reasons for the increase in 
multijurisdictional litigation: (i) Supreme Court precedent that calls for the enforcement of a settlement 
in one state to bind other jurisdictions; (ii) the ability of new, small firms to bring cases without 
investing large amounts of resources; and (iii) other states acting more favorably by deferring more to 
the parties’ settlement numbers. See Thomas, supra note 19, at 1935–41; see also Brian Cheffins et al., 
Delaware Corporate Litigation and the Fragmentation of the Plaintiffs’ Bar, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 427, 431–33 (contending that the rise in deal litigation and the fact that deals are often subject to 
suit in multiple jurisdictions is the result of increasing competition among plaintiffs’ lawyers 
specializing in shareholder litigation over the past 15 years); John C. Coffee Jr., ‘Loser Pays’: Who 
Will Be the Biggest Loser?, 252 N.Y.L.J. 5, 7 (2014) (implicitly supporting the notion that new, 
smaller firms are driving the rise in deal litigation by stating that deal challenges “are generally not 
brought by the elite plaintiff firms (i.e., the larger ones), but by their fly-by-night competitors”).  
 23. Fisch et al., supra note 19, at 559–60. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss2/9
  
 
 
 
 
2015] PAVING THE DELAWARE WAY 341 
 
 
 
 
the value of such frequent merger litigation.
24
 In fact, Delaware judges 
have taken a number of steps to address the concerns of deal-litigation 
critics.  
First, critics contend that deal litigation is brought not by concerned 
shareholders, but by shareholders who are little more than pawns of 
plaintiffs’ firms.25 Critics observe that these shareholders often hold just a 
few shares and, presumably, stand to gain, at most, a few dollars from any 
successful challenge.
26
 In short, these are not truly aggrieved investors, but 
figurehead plaintiffs for lawyer-driven lawsuits. 
Reacting to these criticisms, Delaware courts moved away from legal 
rules that facilitated lawyer-driven deal challenges.
27
 For example, 
Delaware courts abandoned the first-to-file approach to appointing a lead 
plaintiff (and thus lead counsel), instead announcing a number of factors 
to consider in appointing the lead plaintiff, including, among other things, 
the economic stake of the plaintiffs, the absence of any conflicts, and the 
competence of counsel.
28
 Moreover, there is at least one example of a 
Delaware judge invoking Delaware Rule 23’s typicality requirement to 
conduct a more searching inquiry into whether the shareholder plaintiff 
has actual, legitimate gripes, such that the shareholder was “typical” of the 
investor class.
29
 
 
 
 24. See, e.g., Dias v. Purches, No. 7199VCG, 2012 WL 4503174, at *5 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2012) 
(stating that after a merger announcement, litigation “typically follow[s] like mushrooms follow the 
rain” and disclosure-only settlements “obviously create[] a risk of excessive merger litigation, where 
the costs to stockholders exceed the benefits”); In re Cox Commc’ns S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 
605–06 (Del. Ch. 2005) (characterizing disclosure-only settlements as “non-meritorious, premature 
suits attacking negotiable, going-private proposals” in which plaintiffs’ lawyers win “sizable fees . . . 
by settling at the same level that the special committee achieved”). 
 25. See, e.g., Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, File Early, Then Free Ride: How Delaware 
Law (Mis)Shapes Shareholder Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1797, 1822, 1855–56 (2004) 
(examining 104 merger class actions filed in Delaware between 1999 and 2001 and finding that merger 
litigation is lawyer driven, often lacking “real” plaintiffs). 
 26. See, e.g., Solomon, supra note 20. 
 27. See, e.g., John Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 IND. L.J. 1345, 1380 (2012) 
(observing, among other things, that Delaware courts have retreated from the first-to-file custom in 
choosing lead counsel and that this has caused litigators to file cases outside of Delaware); Cheffins et 
al., supra note 22, at 482–84 (documenting Delaware’s “de-emphasis of first-to-file as an ordering 
principle”).  
 28. See, e.g., Hirt v. U.S. Timberlands Serv. Co., No. CIV. A. 19575, 2002 WL 1558342, at *2 
(Del. Ch. July 3, 2002); TCW Tech. Ltd. P’ship v. Intermedia Commc’ns, Inc., No. 18336, 2000 WL 
1654504, at *4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2000); see also David H. Webber, Private Policing of Mergers and 
Acquisitions: An Empirical Assessment of Institutional Lead Plaintiffs in Transactional Class and 
Derivative Actions, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 907, 916 (2014) (finding that “the ‘great weight’ accorded to 
the relative economic stakes of the contestants has ushered in a period of substantial participation of 
institutional-investor lead plaintiffs in Delaware, in some ways paralleling the increased participation 
of these investors in federal securities fraud class actions”).  
 29. See In re Transatlantic Holdings Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6574-CS, 2013 WL 1191738, 
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Second, critics argue that plaintiffs’ lawyers bring deal challenges in 
several jurisdictions, which wastes everyone’s time and money and 
benefits only the plaintiffs’ lawyer.30 Multijurisdictional deal litigation is 
possible because of the nature of the legal claim and the corporate 
defendant. Shareholder litigation is, by its nature, representative. In other 
words, a shareholder sues on behalf of a class of shareholders (shareholder 
class actions) or on behalf of the company (shareholder derivative 
litigation). In representative litigation, more than one shareholder can 
claim to represent the company or shareholders, and thus more than one 
shareholder can sue.
31
 Additionally, defendants in deal litigation are 
always corporate entities. When suing a corporation, shareholders can 
bring claims in any forum that has jurisdiction over that corporation, 
usually the state in which the company is incorporated and in which the 
company keeps its principal place of business.
32
 Thus, identical deal 
challenges are often filed, not just in Delaware, but other states as well.
33
 
But the waste, inefficiencies, and dangers of inconsistent outcomes 
attendant with litigating the same suit in multiple places are obvious.
34
  
 
 
at *2–3 (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 2013) (refusing to grant a joint motion to approve a disclosure-only 
settlement for attorneys’ fees because the settlement “achieved nothing substantial for the class” and 
the plaintiffs, one of whom held only two shares and the other who did not vote on the merger, were 
not proper representatives of the class). Litigators have pointed to Transatlantic as solid precedent 
through which to challenge the adequacy and typicality of class representatives in Delaware. See, e.g., 
Dwight W. Stone II et al., Dealing with the Inevitable: Practical Considerations in Defending Merger 
Objection Lawsuits, DRI: FOR THE DEFENSE, Oct. 2013, at 56.  
 30. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Foreword: The Delaware Court of Chancery: Change, 
Continuity—and Competition, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 387, 388 (noting the increase in 
multijurisdictional deal litigation); Fisch et al., supra note 19, at 605 (same); Minor Myers, Fixing 
Multi-Forum Shareholder Litigation, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 467, 469 (same); Donald F. Parsons, Jr. & 
Jason S. Tyler, Docket Dividends: Growth in Shareholder Litigation Leads to Refinements in 
Chancery Procedures, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 473, 506 (2013) (same); Thomas, supra note 19, at 
1926, 1934 (same).  
 31. See Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, A Theory of Representative Shareholder 
Suits and Its Application to Multijurisdictional Litigation, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1753, 1768 (2012) 
(“[T]here is more than one possible representative for a shareholder group and [plaintiffs’ firms] likely 
will be competing with other plaintiffs' firms to become the lead lawyer.”). 
 32. See, e.g., Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 85, 93 (2010) (holding that a corporation is a 
citizen of the state in which it is incorporated and houses its “nerve center”). 
 33. Armour et al., supra note 27, at 1358 (“[W]hile it used to be common for suits in cases 
arising from large M&A transactions to be filed only in Delaware, this has become rare.”); John 
Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 605, 605 (2012) 
(documenting a trend in which legal challenges to large mergers and acquisitions as well as leveraged 
buy-outs are filed outside Delaware and in multiple jurisdictions); Matthew D. Cain & Steven 
Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. 
REV. 465, 476 (2015) (finding that in 2011, there was a mean of about 5 lawsuits per deal, more than 
half of them being multi-state claims). 
 34. See, e.g., In re Allion Healthcare Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 5022-CC, 2011 WL 1135016, at 
*4 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 2011) (stating that duplicating litigation risks “the possibility that two judges 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss2/9
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In response, Delaware courts upheld intra-corporate forum-selection 
bylaws, which allow companies to adopt charter provisions selecting an 
exclusive forum for intra-entity disputes.
35
 In In re Revlon, Inc. 
Shareholders Litigation,
36
 Vice Chancellor Laster suggested that 
companies could adopt these provisions, but said that the issue had to 
await resolution in the proper case. The proper case presented itself in 
Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp.,
37
 where then-
Chancellor (now Chief Justice) Leo E. Strine upheld the facial validity of 
bylaws requiring that intra-corporate disputes be litigated exclusively in 
Delaware courts. Since Boilermakers, courts across the country have 
adopted this position
38
 and extended its holding to uphold as facially valid 
forum-selection bylaws that select venues other than Delaware.
39
 After 
Boilermakers, private and publicly-traded firms, both in and out of 
Delaware, rushed to adopt exclusive-forum bylaws.
40
 The effect of this 
judicial counter has been significant. Initial filing numbers suggest that 
 
 
would apply the law differently or otherwise reach different outcomes”); Settlement Hearing and 
Rulings of the Court at 54, In re Burlington N. Santa Fe S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 5043-VCL (Del. Ch. 
Oct. 28, 2010) (recognizing that duplicative litigation presents “a conflict between individual 
rationality, where plaintiffs logically benefit from filing multiple actions, and group rationality, where 
efficiency calls for a single forum”); see also Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, supra note 27, 
at 1368–69 (recognizing that duplicative litigation may invite forum shopping to, among other things, 
maximize a fee award or avoid scrutiny of a proposed settlement); Edward B. Micheletti & Jenness E. 
Parker, Multi-Jurisdictional Litigation: Who Caused This Problem, and Can It Be Fixed?, 37 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 1, 12 (2012) (recognizing that duplicative litigation increases costs for defendants, forcing 
them to “consider settling deal litigation that . . . defendants might otherwise have moved to dismiss”).  
 35. See, e.g., Claudia H. Allen, Bylaws Mandating Arbitration of Stockholder Disputes?, 39 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 751, 757 (2015) (“Exclusive forum bylaws are intended to help Delaware corporations 
address forum shopping and the related phenomenon of plaintiffs’ attorneys filing lawsuits arising out 
of the same facts in multiple jurisdictions, often with a view toward obtaining attorneys’ fees.”).  
 36. 990 A.2d 940, 960 & n.8 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 37. 73 A.3d 934, 963 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 38. See, e.g., North v. McNamara, 47 F. Supp. 3d 635, 644 (S.D. Ohio 2014); Groen v. Safeway 
Inc., No. RG14716641, 2014 WL 3405752, at *2 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 14, 2014) (trial order); Hemg 
Inc. v. Aspen Univ., No. 650457/13, 2013 WL 5958388, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 4, 2013) (same).  
 39. See, e.g., City of Providence v. First Citizens BancShares, Inc., 99 A.3d 229, 235 (Del. Ch. 
2014) (upholding a forum-selection bylaw that designated North Carolina as the exclusive forum for 
intra-corporate disputes).  
 40. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 35, at 760 n.47 (“Following Boilermakers, public companies once 
again began to adopt exclusive forum bylaws, with 105 Delaware corporations and 30 non-Delaware 
corporations and trusts adopting exclusive forum bylaws between June 25 and October 31, 2013.”); 
Joseph A. Grundfest & Kristen A. Savelle, The Brouhaha Over Intra-Corporate Forum Selection 
Provisions: A Legal, Economic, and Political Analysis, 68 BUS. LAW. 325, 326 (2013) (observing that 
“[t]hree hundred publicly traded entities have adopted [intra-corporate forum selection] provisions as 
of September 30, 2012”); see also CLAUDIA H. ALLEN, TRENDS IN EXCLUSIVE FORUM BYLAWS 
(2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2411715&download=yes 
(summarizing Delaware and non-Delaware companies with forum-selection bylaws). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
344 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 93:335 
 
 
 
 
after Boilermakers and its progeny, multi-state litigation has trended 
downward.
41
 
Third, critics contend that settlements in deal cases yield little to no 
value for investors. Deal litigation settles for money, an amendment to the 
terms of the deal, an increase in consideration, supplemental disclosures in 
the proxy statement, or some combination of those.
42
 In most deal 
litigation, the litigation settles before the deal closes,
43
 and most often, 
companies settle by agreeing to make additional disclosures about the 
terms of the deal.
44
  
Troubling critics is the fact that, in most deal litigation, the lawyers 
receive fees while investors receive additional disclosures that just do not 
seem to matter to the deal.
45
 To be sure, supplemental disclosures can 
 
 
 41. Cain & Solomon, Takeover Litigation in 2014, supra note 21, at 2–3 (finding that in 2012, 
multi-state claims were 52.7%; in 2013, multi-state claims were 41.8%; and in 2014, multi-state claims 
were 33.8%, and stating that the decrease “may be due to the effectiveness and increasing use of forum 
selection by-laws, but remains to be explored further”).  
 42. See, e.g., Fisch et al., supra note 19, at 566 (describing the types of recovery for the plaintiff 
class, including monetary recovery, amendments to the merger agreement, and supplemental 
disclosures in the form of additional information in the merger proxy statement); see also Cain & 
Solomon, supra note 33, at 478 (same). 
 43. See, e.g., CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 18, at 4 (“As in prior years, litigation for the 
majority of deals [in 2013] was resolved before the deal was closed—75 percent of 2013 deals. . . . Of 
the 2013 deals resolved before the deal closed, 88 percent were settled, 9 percent withdrawn by 
plaintiffs, and 3 percent dismissed by courts.”); Fisch et al., supra note 19, at 566 (“Empirical studies 
confirm . . . incentives [for defendants to resolve merger challenges before the deal closes], finding 
that nearly 70% of merger claims settle while the rest are dismissed.”). 
 44. See, e.g., CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SETTLEMENTS OF SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 
INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: REVIEW OF 2013 M&A LITIGATION 1 (2014), available at 
https://www.cornerstone.com/GetAttachment/7bd80347-124b-4b69-add5-575e33c3f61b/Settlements-
of-M-and-A-Shareholder-Litigation.pdf (“Settlements for additional disclosures, or additional 
disclosures plus other terms, remained prevalent. Nearly 92 percent of settlements reached in 2013 
included such deal terms.”); Cain & Solomon, supra note 33, at 478 (stating that settlements requiring 
only disclosure of additional information are the “most common type of settlement”); Fisch et al., 
supra note 19, at 572 (footnote omitted) (“[P]laintiffs negotiate, and courts approve, corrective 
disclosure in more than 60% of all transactions. It is implausible to think that 60% of all mergers (or 
80% in the last several years) with public company targets and a transaction value of more than $100 
million, deals that are staffed by top quality lawyers and investment bankers, involve materially 
deficient disclosures.”). 
 45. See, e.g., Settlement Hearing at 21, Masucci v. Fibernet Telecom Grp., C.A. No. 4680-VCS 
(Del. Ch. Nov. 25, 2009) (“[T]here seems to be a repeated pattern of essentially hidden hope 
disclosure claims, where we’re going to nitpick disclosures which, frankly, if you compare the quality 
and substance of the disclosures that are given today to those given even ten years ago, there’s no 
comparison.”); see also Thomas, supra note 19, at 1934 (quoting Vice Chancellor Laster as saying 
“[t]he increase in disclosure-only settlements is troubling. Disclosure claims can be settled cheaply and 
easily, creating a cycle of supplementation that confers minimal, if any, benefits on the class”); Steven 
Davidoff Solomon, Corporate Takeover? In 2013, A Lawsuit Almost Always Followed, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 10, 2014, 12:20 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/10/corporate-takeover-in-2013-a-
lawsuit-almost-always-followed/?_r=0 (“[D]isclosure-only settlements have been criticized for being 
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provide meaningful information, such as revealing that managers are 
genuinely conflicted with respect to the transaction.
46
 But the criticism is 
that most of these supplemental disclosures are not beneficial to investors. 
For one thing, disclosing information already contained in the proxy, 
correcting typographical errors, or adding useless or otherwise immaterial 
details are just a few examples of suggested disclosures used to extract 
attorneys’ fees.47 Further, a regression analysis of disclosure-only 
settlements by Professors Fisch, Griffith, and Solomon has found no 
consistent relationship between supplemental disclosures and shareholder 
voting on the deal, and they rightly observe, “if the disclosure does not 
affect the shareholder vote, it is difficult to see how shareholders benefit 
from it.”48 They go on to summarize their findings, and, bottom line, “[t]he 
benefit produced by disclosure-only settlements is anything but 
substantial. Indeed, it would be closer to the truth to say that it is 
imaginary.”49 If the shareholders are not receiving money or material 
disclosures, what do they gain?
50
 
What is most problematic, critics say, is that defendants are motivated 
to settle these lawsuits quickly lest the deal be upended.
51
 Plaintiffs can 
 
 
‘cheap’ settlements that benefit only plaintiffs’ lawyers and only further encourage litigation without 
merit.”). 
 46. See Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners, 562 A.2d 1162, 1165 (Del. 1989) (“[A] heightened 
level of corporate disclosure, if attributable to the filing of a meritorious suit, may justify an award of 
counsel fees.”). 
 47. See, e.g., In re Sauer-Danfoss Inc. S’holders Litig., 65 A.3d 1116, 1136 (Del. Ch. 2011) (“All 
supplemental disclosures are not equal.”); In re BEA Sys., Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 3298-VCL, 
2009 WL 1931641, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 24, 2009) (noting that supplemental disclosures that consisted 
of correcting an analyst’s name and a press-release date were “unmistakably modest”). 
 48. Fisch et al., supra note 19, at 588–89. 
 49. Id. at 601. 
 50. Proponents respond that shareholder litigation, even if it does achieve just meager additional 
disclosures, is worthwhile for several reasons. First, deal litigation has resulted in a “marked 
improvement” in disclosure generally, and now, all companies withhold or later disclose tangential 
information. See Sumpter, supra note 20, at 686–88. Second, deal litigation and resulting settlement 
enables buyers of companies to obtain valuable releases that accompany settlement, meaning they do 
not have to worry about new claims popping up from shareholders. See Sean J. Griffith & Alexandra 
D. Lahav, The Market for Preclusion in Merger Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1053, 1057–59, 1075–86 
(2013). Third, even the rare frivolous lawsuit is acceptable in the grand scheme of things as it funds 
the war chests of private attorneys general to pursue other, actual frauds or breaches of fiduciary 
duties. See Solomon, supra note 20.  
 51. See, e.g., Coffee, Jr., supra note 30, at 392 (stating that deal litigation is likely to settle 
because “target management (and the bidder as well) are under time pressure to close a deal”); Fisch et 
al., supra note 19, at 565 (“Plaintiffs in merger litigation typically ask for equitable relief—most often 
in the form of an injunction barring consummation of the transaction or requiring a substantial revision 
of its terms, such as a higher price.”); Steven M. Haas, Little Deals, Big Fees? Addressing Attorneys’ 
Fee Awards in Small-Cap M&A Litigation, 17 M&A LAW. 3, 6 (2013) (explaining that “‘[d]eal 
litigation’ [is] expensive because it typically proceeds on an expedited basis, involves electronic 
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make a settlement palatable—even attractive—by seeking superficial 
changes to the deal, requesting reasonable fees,
52
 and agreeing to broad 
releases of liability.
53
 A settlement seeking only cosmetic changes is easy 
to swallow for defendants who are eager to consummate the deal, aware 
that insurance typically foots the bill for plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees, and 
receptive to the benefits provided by a broad release of liability.
54
 Parties 
to the dispute then present the settlement jointly to the court. With no red 
flags to pique a judge’s interest, a court will have to raise objections on its 
own, something that it is unlikely to do.
55
 
To counter this dynamic and to ensure that settlements in deal cases 
actually provide something for investors and not just their lawyers, 
Delaware courts have more closely scrutinized settlements—outright 
rejecting them if the disclosures did not materially change the total mix of 
 
 
discovery and depositions of directors, officers, and financial advisors and requires the defendants to 
defend against a motion for a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order”).  
 52. From 2005 to 2013, the mean attorneys’ fees for disclosure-only settlements ranged from 
about $400,000 on the low end to about $1.1 million on the high end. Cain & Davidoff, Takeover 
Litigation in 2013, supra note 21, at 4. Fees for 2014 observed a slight uptick with the mean attorneys’ 
fee going from $489,000 in 2013, to $531,000 in 2014. Cain & Solomon, Takeover Litigation in 2014, 
supra note 21, at 3–4. Nevertheless, attorneys’ fees do not appear so high that they will derail a $500-
million deal. 
 53. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 29, at 61 (“Fortunately for defendants that wish to reach an early 
settlement, the plaintiffs’ bar agrees! Parties can often meet this goal by entering into a[] 
[Memorandum of Understanding] that outlines fair, reasonable, and adequate supplemental disclosures 
in exchange for a sufficiently broad release of liability for defendants.”); Sumpter, supra note 20, at 
681–82 (explaining that defendants are motivated to settle deal challenges “since they can . . . obtain a 
broad release of all potential deal-related claims”).  
 54. See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder Litigation 
by Shifting the Doctrine on Fees, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1, 16–18, 25–26 (2015) (explaining that defendants 
are attracted to broad releases from liability they can obtain cheaply in a disclosure-only settlement); 
see generally Doug Clark, Why Merger Cases Settle, BOARDMEMBER.COM (June 6, 2013), 
https://www.wsgr.com/publications/PDFsearch/clark-0613.pdf (outlining why companies settle deal 
challenges even if the challenge is meritless); Anthony Tatum, Securing D&O For Attorneys’ Fees in 
Securities Cases, LAW360 (May 28, 2013, 11:57 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/ 
444555/securing-d-o-for-attorneys-fees-in-securities-cases, archived at http://perma.cc/PHU3-KBT6 
(explaining that D&O insurance often covers attorneys’ fees in deal litigation). 
 55. See Fisch et al., supra note 19, at 569 (recognizing that a court’s task in reviewing and 
approving disclosure-only settlements in deal litigation is complicated by the fact that “the settlement 
hearing is likely to be nonadversarial in nature”); Griffith, supra note 54, at 20–21 (explaining that 
judges are loathe to determine a settlement has no value because doing so may “condemn the 
defendant to further rounds of non-meritorious litigation that may ultimately cost the defendant more 
than the settlement itself”); Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in 
Antitrust and Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L. REV. 991, 1053 (2002) (footnote 
omitted) (“Despite their authority to reject settlements and the inherent problems of coupon-based 
settlements in class action litigation, courts routinely approve such settlements. This is not surprising 
given that for many class action settlements, court approval is a mere formality. For a variety of 
systemic and case-specific reasons, courts are loathe to reject proposed settlements in class action 
litigation.”).  
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information available to stockholders.
56
 Even when Delaware courts are 
not rejecting settlements outright, they have cut fees where the benefit 
achieved only minimal value for investors.
57
 According to some scholars, 
Delaware courts started this trend in 2001, gradually conducting a more 
incisive inquiry into whether the settlement produced any benefit for 
shareholders.
58
  
This is not to criticize Delaware courts as unthinking or reactionary. To 
the contrary, these developments have been gradual, measured responses 
to specific threats. Nevertheless, it is easy to lump these responses under a 
broad umbrella of hostility to shareholder litigation generally. And once 
that level of abstraction is reached, given the Delaware judiciary’s 
 
 
 56. See, e.g., Settlement Hearing and the Court’s Ruling, In re Medicis Pharm. Corp. S’holders 
Litig., No. 7857-CS (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2014), 2014 WL 1614336 (rejecting settlement to deal 
challenge that provided for supplemental disclosure and $400,000 in attorneys’ fees because the 
disclosures did not “materially change[] the informational mix”); In re Transatlantic Holdings Inc. 
S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6574-CS, 2013 WL 1191738, at *2–3 (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 2013) (rejecting 
settlement to deal challenge that provided for supplemental disclosure and attorneys’ fees because the 
court had serious doubts about the usefulness of the agreed-upon disclosures). 
 57. See Sumpter, supra note 20, at 714–15, 729 (surveying court scrutiny of disclosure-only 
settlements and finding that the Delaware Court of Chancery “is not approving disclosure-only 
settlements without first looking closely at the plaintiff’s counsel’s fee award. . . . [and] adjust[ing] its 
award of attorneys’ fees to either encourage or discourage similar future litigation” and is likely to 
reduce attorneys’ fees where disclosures are too meager, claims are weak at the outset, the plaintiffs’ 
claimed work was inflated, or the case settled early). 
 58. See, e.g., Armour et al., supra note 33, at 643–44; see also Settlement Hearing & Rulings of 
the Court at 11–18, In re The Talbots, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 7513-CS (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 
2013) (stating that attorneys’ fees do not automatically start with $400,000 or $500,000 for disclosure-
only settlements and then awarding attorneys $237,000 in fees); Hearing on Plaintiffs’ Application for 
Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses & Rulings of the Court at 11, 60, In re Complete Genomics, 
Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 7888-VCL (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2013) (denying request for $1.4 million in 
fees and awarding $315,000 instead); Settlement Hearing & Rulings of the Court at 47–49, In re Gen-
Probe Inc., S’holders Litig., No. 7495-VCL (Del. Ch. Apr. 10, 2013) (denying request for $450,000 in 
fees and awarding $100,000 instead); Settlement Hearing at 39, In re Craftmade Int’l, Inc., S’holders 
Litig., C.A. No. 6950-VCL (Del. Ch. Jan. 10, 2013) (denying request for attorneys’ fees and awarding 
$650,000 instead); Settlement Hearing at 55, In re Access to Money, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 
6816-VCN (Del. Ch. May 31, 2012) (denying request for $400,000 in fees and awarding $275,000 
instead); Final Order & Judgment, In re Icagen, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 6692-CS (Del. Ch. Apr. 5, 
2012), 2012 WL 1144994 (denying request for $1.25 million in fees and awarding $350,000 instead); 
Order & Final Judgment, In re Inspire Pharm. Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 6378-VCP, 2012 WL 275115 
(Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2012) (trial order) (refusing to award $500,000 in requested attorneys’ fees and 
awarding $300,000 instead because benefits of disclosures were relatively meager); Settlement 
Hearing at 36, Roffe v. Eagle Rock Energy GP, L.P., No. 5258-VCL (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2010) 
(refusing to award $535,000 in requested attorneys’ fees and awarding $200,000 instead because the 
disclosures were otherwise unimpressive); Settlement Hearing & Rulings of the Court at 63, Jeffrey 
Benison IRA v. Critical Therapeutics, Inc., C.A. No. 4039-VCL (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2009) (denying 
request for $450,000 in attorneys’ fees and awarding $175,000 instead); In re Nat’l City Corp. 
S’holders Litig., No. 4123-CC, 2009 WL 2425389, at *6 (Del. Ch. July 31, 2009) (refusing to award 
$1.2 million in requested attorneys’ fees and awarding $400,000 instead because the disclosures were 
too “meager” to be included on the company’s proxy statement). 
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criticism of deal litigation, it is easy to see why many read ATP as a sign 
that Delaware was working to further stymy deal litigation. Thus, 
commentators have interpreted ATP as encouragement for public 
companies to adopt similar fee-shifting bylaws.
59
 In fact, after ATP, 
several (mostly small-cap) companies adopted bylaws that purport to shift 
litigation expenses in shareholder and securities lawsuits.
60
 Similar to the 
broad bylaws upheld in ATP, these bylaws do not simply require plaintiffs 
to pay legal expenses if they lose, but they target a broad range of actors 
and require them to pay all costs if they do not “substantially achieve[], in 
substance and amount, the full remedy sought.”61 
Institutional investors warn that ATP poses a serious threat to investors’ 
ability to sue. They wrote letters to Delaware’s governor, the chair of the 
Delaware Bar Association’s Section of Corporate Law, and several 
others.
62
 They said that fee-shifting bylaws would “foreclos[e] 
stockholders’ access to courts” and “effectively make corporate directors 
and officers unaccountable for serious wrongdoing.”63 Moreover, in 
another correspondence, the investors said that “[i]f corporations adopt 
fee-shifting bylaws in large numbers, the judiciary will be relegated to the 
sidelines.”64 The upshot, institutional investors claim, is that ATP’s 
 
 
 59. See, e.g., Anthony J. Rospert & Thomas M. Ritzert, Limiting Shareholder Suits in Mergers & 
Acquisitions: Potential Corporate Governance Solutions, THE DEAL (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www. 
thompsonhine.com/uploads/1137/doc/Thompson_Hine_Article_2LimitingShareholder_FINAL.pdf (“The 
Delaware Supreme Court’s recent opinion in ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, though issued 
in the context of a fee-shifting provision adopted by a non-stock corporation, suggests that this may be 
a viable approach for public companies seeking to curb merger objection litigation.”).  
 60. See, e.g., Lee Rudy, Litigation Bylaws, CII (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.cii.org/files/ 
issues_and_advocacy/legal_issues/Litigation%20Bylaws.pdf (listing 42 companies that adopted fee-
shifting bylaws as of November 2014); J. Robert Brown Jr., Fee Shifting Bylaws and the Reaction of 
Institutional Investors (Part 1), THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG (Dec. 11, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www. 
theracetothebottom.org/home/2014/12/11/fee-shifting-bylaws-and-the-reaction-of-institutional-invest. 
html (reporting similarly that after ATP, “the number of companies adopting [fee-shifting bylaws] 
proliferated”). Notably, however, no large cap companies have adopted fee-shifting bylaws. Claudia 
H. Allen, Fee-Shifting Bylaws: Where Are We Now?, BLOOMBERG LAW (Feb. 2, 2015), 
http://www.bna.com/feeshifting-bylaws-n17179922685/. 
 61. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 556 (Del. 2014); see also Coffee, 
supra note 22, at 5–7.  
 62. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 60. 
 63. Letter from Institutional Investors to the Honorable Jack Markell, Governor (Nov. 24, 2014), 
available at http://www.law.du.edu/documents/corporate-governance/legislation/letters-2014/Letter-
to-The-Honorable-Jack-Markell-Office-of-the-Governor-from-Institutional-Investors-Re-Fee-Shifting-
Bylaws-Nov-24-2014.pdf.  
 64. Letter from Institutional Investors to Robert McCormick, Chief Policy Officer, Glass, Lewis 
& Co., LLC (Nov. 24, 2014), available at http://www.law.du.edu/documents/corporate-governance/ 
legislation/letters-2014/Letter-to-Robert-McCormick-Chief-Policy-Officer-Glass-Lewis-Company-LLC-
from-Institutional-Investors-Re-Fee-Shifting-Bylaws-Nov-24-2014.pdf.  
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consequences would be “severe and detrimental to the integrity of the 
capital markets.”65 
Shortly after ATP, the Delaware Corporate Council proposed a statute 
that would forbid any charter or bylaw of a Delaware stock company from 
imposing monetary liability, or responsibility for any debts of the 
company, on any corporate stockholder.
66
 But by June 2015, the Delaware 
legislature postponed any action, sending the matter back to the Delaware 
Bar to examine the issue.
67
 The Delaware Bar then proposed legislation 
that would prohibit Delaware companies from adopting, in the certificate 
of incorporation or bylaws, any provision that “impose[s] liability on a 
stockholder for the attorneys’ fees or expenses of the corporation or any 
other party in connection with an intracorporate claim.”68 In June 2015, the 
Delaware legislature adopted that approach to fee-shifting bylaws, while 
also refusing to render forum-selection bylaws facially invalid.
69
  
III. UNDERSTANDING ATP AS PART OF THE DELAWARE WAY 
ATP, however, was not a shareholder or deal case at all, and it is not 
part of the Delaware judiciary’s response to the explosion of deal 
litigation. Rather, it represents the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
commitment to the “Delaware Way.” The Delaware Way is to empower 
corporate boards with broad legal authority to manage the business of the 
company, and to check the exercise of that power through mandatory 
shareholder voting and review of board action under equitable principles.
70
 
In ATP, the Delaware Supreme Court held that corporate boards of non-
stock companies had the legal authority to adopt fee-shifting bylaws, but 
 
 
 65. Id.  
 66. S. 236, 147th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2014) (proposing to limit ATP to non-stock 
companies).  
 67. S.J. Res. 12, 147th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2014).  
 68. See DEL. CORP. LAW COUNCIL, AN ACT TO AMEND TITLE 8 OF THE DELAWARE CODE 
RELATING TO THE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW §§ 2, 3 (2015) (proposing legislation), available at 
http://www.delawarelitigation.com/files/2015/03/COUNCIL-SECOND-PROPOSAL-U01245103.doc.  
 69. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(f), 114(b), 115 (2015). 
 70. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the 
New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 675–76 (2005); see also Leo E. 
Strine, Jr., If Corporate Action Is Lawful, Presumably There Are Circumstances in Which It Is 
Equitable to Take That Action: The Implicit Corollary to the Rule of Schnell v. Chris-Craft, 60 BUS. 
LAW. 877, 877 (2005) (defining “The Delaware Way” as “Invest[ing] Broad Legal Authority in 
Directors, but Subject[ing] Their Use of That Authority to Equitable Oversight”). As applied to fee 
shifting, to paraphrase Theodore Mirvis and William Savitt, ATP vests Delaware courts with the 
ability “to do what they have always done: to distinguish the reasonable from the unreasonable, the 
legitimate from the illegitimate.” Theodore N. Mirvis & William Savitt, Shifting the Focus: Let the 
Courts Decide, 53 BANK & CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REP. 8, 11 (2015). 
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that the adoption and enforcement of those bylaws must be equitable under 
the circumstances.
71
 This Part outlines the Delaware Way of corporate 
governance and explains how ATP is consistent with that model.  
A. The Delaware Way 
Before his appointment to Delaware’s Supreme Court, Chief Justice 
Strine explained his view of the Delaware Way.
72
 It consists of two 
features: a broad grant of legal authority to corporate boards, but curtailing 
that broad grant of legal authority by protecting fundamental shareholder 
rights and policing managerial abuse with equitable principles, such as the 
fiduciary duties of care, good faith, and loyalty.
73
  
First, Delaware corporation law was intentionally designed to be 
efficient and flexible. It enables company-specific procedures and 
provides corporate planners flexibility to accomplish legitimate corporate 
ends.
74
 In fact, the Delaware General Corporate Law (“DGCL”) explicitly 
accepts the notion that shareholders may delegate to the board of directors 
legal authority to manage the corporation, providing that a corporation’s 
“business and affairs . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a 
board of directors,”75 and bylaws can regulate anything “relating to the 
business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or 
powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or 
employees.”76 Delaware courts reinforce this structure, presuming that 
director actions in accordance with the corporation’s business judgment 
will be left undisturbed.
77
 
 
 
 71. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014). 
 72. See Strine, The Delaware Way, supra note 70, at 674–79. 
 73. Id. at 674–77, 686 (“[Delaware does] not tie down all boards with a prescriptive set of 
procedural mandates. We do not create a thousand boxes to check. Instead, we give managers broad 
flexibility to chart the course that they believe is best for their corporations, using the stockholder 
franchise and the potency of fiduciary duty review to ensure managerial fidelity.”).  
 74. Id. at 674–75; see also Strine, If Corporate Action is Lawful, supra note 70, at 879. 
 75. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2015); see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 
1984) (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a)) (“A cardinal precept of the General Corporation Law of 
the State of Delaware is that directors, rather than shareholders, manage the business and affairs of the 
corporation.”), overruled by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
 76. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2015). 
 77. See, e.g., Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (stating that the business judgment rule acknowledges 
“the managerial prerogatives of Delaware directors under Section 141(a)” by presuming that “in 
making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and 
in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company,” and thus, “[a]bsent 
an abuse of discretion, that judgment will be respected by the courts”).  
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In essence, the DGCL is enabling, providing managers “an enormous 
amount of leeway to act.”78 This flexible design was intended to benefit 
not just the interests of corporate managers, but also to give stockholders 
the freedom to construct charter and bylaw provisions that address 
company-specific needs.
79
 This principle has been echoed by the Delaware 
courts.
80
  
Second, Delaware also recognizes that managers can use their broad 
power for inimical ends or purposes that may align with managers’ but not 
shareholders’ interests. Therefore, Delaware overlays two mechanisms to 
safeguard against abuse: shareholders’ fundamental rights and equitable 
review.
81
 This means that, even if the board of directors has the common-
 
 
 78. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Inescapably Empirical Foundation of the Common Law of 
Corporations, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 499, 501 (2002); see also id. at 501 (“[The DGCL] is broadly 
enabling, and thus permits corporations to engage in virtually any otherwise lawful act, subject 
generally only to the requirement that the acts be accomplished in the manner specified by the 
statute.”); Jill E. Fisch, Leave It to Delaware: Why Congress Should Stay Out of Corporate 
Governance, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731, 742 (2013) (“Delaware’s corporate law is largely enabling 
rather than mandatory.”); Strine, If Corporate Action Is Lawful, supra note 70, at 879 (“[The DGCL] is 
an enabling statute that provides corporate directors with capacious authority to pursue business 
advantage by a wide variety of means.”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Delaware’s Corporate-Law System: Is 
Corporate America Buying an Exquisite Jewel or a Diamond in the Rough? A Response to Kahan & 
Kamar’s Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1257, 1260 
(2001) (describing the “Delaware Model” as “largely enabling and provid[ing] a wide realm for 
private ordering”). 
 79. Strine, The Delaware Way, supra note 70, at 675. 
 80. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 957 (Del. 1985) (“[O]ur 
corporate law is not static. It must grow and develop in response to, indeed in anticipation of, evolving 
concepts and needs. Merely because the General Corporation Law is silent as to a specific matter does 
not mean that it is prohibited.”); Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1351 (Del. 1985) 
(quoting Unocal’s language); see also Shintom Co. v. Audiovox Corp., 888 A.2d 225, 227 (Del. 2005) 
(“The Delaware General Corporation Law is an enabling statute that provides great flexibility for 
creating the capital structure of a Delaware corporation.”); Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 
818 A.2d 914, 939 (Del. 2003) (Veasey, C.J., dissenting) (“The beauty of the Delaware corporation 
law, and the reason it has worked so well for stockholders, directors and officers, is that the framework 
is based on an enabling statute with the Court of Chancery and the Supreme Court applying principles 
of fiduciary duty in a common law mode on a case-by-case basis.”). 
 81. See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1988) (“In 
discharging this function [of governance], the directors owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the 
corporation and its shareholders.”); Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining 
Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 633 (2010) (“[The DGCL] is broadly 
enabling, in the sense that it gives directors capacious authority to undertake lawful actions of various 
kinds in the pursuit of profit, subject to two important constraints: (1) a discrete set of mandatory 
statutory rules, such as requirements for director elections and stockholder votes and (2) the 
requirement that director actions authorized by law be undertaken in conformity with equity.”); Strine, 
Delaware’s Corporate-Law System, supra note 78, at 1260 (“[T]he Delaware Model is premised on a 
statute, that statute provides corporate boards with a substantial amount of leeway to govern their 
corporations as they see fit. Aside from the corporate electoral process mandated by the Delaware 
statute, the ultimate protection provided to investors by Delaware law is the guarantee that its courts 
will hold directors responsible for living up to their fundamental fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.”); 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
352 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 93:335 
 
 
 
 
law, contractual authority to exercise its business judgment, the Delaware 
courts will enjoin board action where it interferes with the fundamental 
rights of shareholders or where it is inequitable under the circumstances.  
In terms of fundamental rights, Delaware gives shareholders the power 
to vote, sell, and sue.
82
 Indeed, Delaware law explicitly demands that 
stockholders meet once a year to exercise their right to vote, and subjects 
certain transactions to stockholder approval.
83
  
In addition, Delaware polices managerial abuse with courts of equity.
84
 
As Chief Justice Strine explained, the Delaware legislature made a policy 
choice to deploy Delaware courts “to guarantee the integrity of our 
corporate law through the articulation of common law principles of 
equitable behavior for [our] corporate fiduciaries.”85 In this sense, 
 
 
Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
1749, 1782–83 (2006) (noting that “the DGCL establishes default rules on central matters, such as 
economic rights and voting rights of stock,” but also that these rules “can be changed by private 
agreement almost without limit,” except to the extent that they “alter fundamental aspects of the 
system, such as judicial enforcement of fiduciary duties or the allocation of control as between 
directors and stockholders”). 
 82. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (establishing stockholder right to vote to elect directors); 
id. § 242(b)(2) (entitling stockholders to vote on charter amendments); id. § 251(c) (requiring 
stockholder vote for merger); id. § 271(a) (requiring stockholder vote for sale of “all or substantially 
all” of company's assets); id. § 327 (creating stockholder’s right to initiate a lawsuit on behalf of a 
corporation); see also Strougo v. Hollander, 111 A.3d 590, 595 n.21 (Del. Ch. 2015) (“Modern 
corporate law recognizes that stockholders have three fundamental, substantive rights: to vote, to sell, 
and to sue.”). 
 83. See, e.g., Strine, The Delaware Way, supra note 70, at 675–76. 
 84. See, e.g., Sample v. Morgan, 914 A.2d 647, 664 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“An essential aspect of our 
form of corporate law is the balance between law (in the form of statute and contract, including the 
contracts governing the internal affairs of corporations, such as charters and bylaws) and equity (in the 
form of concepts of fiduciary duty). Stockholders can entrust directors with broad legal authority 
precisely because they know that that authority must be exercised consistently with equitable 
principles of fiduciary duty.”); Hollinger Int’l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1078 (Del. Ch. 2004) 
(“The DGCL is intentionally designed to provide directors and stockholders with flexible authority, 
permitting great discretion for private ordering and adaptation. That capacious grant of power is 
policed in large part by the common law of equity, in the form of fiduciary duty principles.”); Strine, 
The Delaware Way, supra note 70, at 676; see also Strine, If Corporate Action Is Lawful, supra note 
70, at 880 (stating that Delaware uses a court of equity “to ensure that corporate directors do not use 
the wide authority granted to them by statute for ends that are inimical to the best interests of the 
corporations they serve”); Strine, The Inescapably Empirical Foundation, supra note 78, at 501 
(“Delaware’s enabling statute is premised on its use within a system of corporate law that uses the 
common law of fiduciary duties as an additional restraint on director action.”).  
 85. Strine, If Corporate Action Is Lawful, supra note 70, at 879; see also William T. Allen et al., 
Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. 
LAW. 1287, 1289 (2001) (footnote omitted) (“Over the course of the twentieth century, the mandatory 
features of the statutory law gradually decreased. Statutes became increasingly elegant and flexible, 
continuously moving away from a mandatory or prescriptive model and ever closer to a pure 
contractual or enabling model. As a consequence, what emerged as a counterpoint to the evolution of 
the enabling model of corporation law was the second key function of the law of corporations: the ex 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss2/9
  
 
 
 
 
2015] PAVING THE DELAWARE WAY 353 
 
 
 
 
equitable principles of fiduciary duty overlay and constrain the statutory 
powers of directors.
86
 
The Delaware Way, Chief Justice Strine says, is perfectly captured by 
Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.,
87
 where the Delaware Supreme 
Court “emphatically rejected the proposition that compliance with the 
DGCL was all that was required of directors to satisfy their obligations to 
the corporation and its stockholders.”88 Schnell plainly articulated the 
separate roles of law and equity when it stated, “inequitable action does 
not become permissible simply because it is legally possible.”89 Per Chief 
Justice Strine, under the Delaware Way, when a judge in equity is 
confronted with corporate action alleged to be dangerous to shareholders, 
that judge must ask two questions: “(1) is that action authorized by statute 
and by the corporation’s governing instruments? and (2) if so, is it 
equitable in the circumstances? These are separate inquiries.”90  
B. ATP as Part of the Delaware Way 
In ATP, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the facial validity of a 
bylaw that demanded that members of a non-stock company pay the 
company’s litigation costs where that member brings an unsuccessful 
intracorporate lawsuit.
91
 ATP came to the Delaware Supreme Court on 
certified questions of law.
92
 In the course of answering the district court’s 
 
 
post judicial review of the actions of corporate officers and directors, measured by fiduciary 
principles.”).  
 86. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Consent in Corporate Law, 70 BUS. LAW. 161, 171 (2014) 
(“[I]t is a fundamental premise of Delaware corporate law that the governing statute is broadly 
enabling and confers enormous and essentially exclusive managerial powers on the board of 
directors—BUT—subject at all times to the potential for oversight by the courts to police inequitable 
use of those powers.”); Strine, If Corporate Action Is Lawful, supra note 70, at 882; Strine, The 
Inescapably Empirical Foundation, supra note 78, at 501 (“Delaware’s enabling statute is premised on 
its use within a system of corporate law that uses the common law of fiduciary duties as an additional 
restraint on director action. This fiduciary restraint enables stockholders to benefit safely from the 
flexibility of the DGCL’s enabling approach because the common law limits the ability of directors to 
abuse that flexibility for their own self-interest at the stockholders’ expense.”).  
 87. 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971). 
 88. Strine, If Corporate Action Is Lawful, supra note 70, at 881. 
 89. Schnell, 285 A.2d at 439.  
 90. Strine, If Corporate Action Is Lawful, supra note 70, at 880. 
 91. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 560 (Del. 2014). 
 92. The Association of Tennis Professionals (“ATP”) is a non-stock company. Its members are 
various tournament operators. As a condition of their membership, the tournament operators agreed to 
be bound by ATP’s bylaws, as amended from time to time. In 2006, ATP’s board of directors amended 
the bylaws and adopted a fee-shifting provision that required plaintiffs to bear all fees, costs, and 
expenses that ATP incurred in unsuccessful intra-corporate litigation. Id. at 555–56. 
 To revitalize its popularity with other sporting events, ATP reorganized its professional tennis 
circuit. Under this reorganization, two tournament operators were downgraded, effectively making 
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four certified questions, the Delaware Supreme Court (with the recently 
appointed Chief Justice Strine) held as follows. First, fee-shifting bylaws 
are not prohibited by Delaware law.
93
 Second, Delaware law does not 
prohibit a fee-shifting bylaw even if it purports to apply to members who 
join the company before the board of directors adopted that bylaw.
94
 Third, 
a fee-shifting bylaw is unenforceable if the board of directors adopts or 
invokes it for an improper purpose or adopting or implementing it would 
be inconsistent with fiduciary obligations under the circumstances.
95
 
The bylaw upheld in ATP was incredibly wide-reaching. First, it 
applied to current and former members of the company as well as to any 
entity who offered “substantial assistance” to those members in pressing 
their claim.
96
 The bylaw could reach plaintiffs’ lawyers, their expert 
witnesses, investigators, and witnesses. Second, the bylaw required fee 
shifting in any case short of a clear victory. The bylaw provided for fee 
shifting in the event that the company’s members failed to “obtain a 
judgment on the merits that substantially achieves, in substance and 
amount, the full remedy sought.”97 Last, the fees shifted included all costs 
“of every kind and description,” including “reasonable attorneys’ fees and 
other litigation expenses.”98 
Nevertheless, although the bylaw upheld as facially valid was very 
broad, ATP reiterated that what is legal is not always permissible under 
Delaware law. Thus, ATP illustrates the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
commitment to the Delaware Way, providing broad power to management 
 
 
their tournaments less prestigious. Id. at 556. These two tour operators sued, claiming that the 
downgrade was an antitrust violation and a breach of fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and good faith. 
Id. The two tour operators lost a jury trial. Id. ATP then sought attorneys’ fees, invoking its fee-
shifting bylaw. Id. The federal court refused to enforce it, stating that fee shifting was contrary to the 
federal antitrust laws’ policy of encouraging private rights of action. Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP 
Tour, Inc., No. 07-178, 2009 WL 3367041, at *4 (D. Del. Oct. 19, 2009), vacated, 480 F. App’x 124 
(3d Cir. 2012). ATP appealed, however, and the Third Circuit vacated the district court’s order, noting 
that the district court should have first decided whether ATP’s fee-shifting bylaw was enforceable as a 
matter of Delaware law. Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour Inc., 480 F. App’x 124, 128 n.5 (3d Cir. 
2012). On remand, the district court decided that whether the fee-shifting bylaw was enforceable was a 
matter best decided by the Delaware courts and certified four questions for review. Deutscher Tennis 
Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., No. 07-178, 2013 WL 4478033, at *1 n.1 (D. Del. Aug. 20, 2013).  
 93. ATP, 91 A.3d at 557–59. Related to the question of whether the fee-shifting bylaw was 
facially valid, the court also confronted whether a bylaw could be lawfully enforced against a member 
that obtained no relief at all on its claim against the company, even if the bylaw might be 
unenforceable in a different situation. Id. at 558. This question is inextricably bound up with the first.  
 94. Id. at 560. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 556.  
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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under Delaware corporate law, but emphasizing that while legal, such 
bylaws are still subject to equitable review. 
First, ATP plainly held that the board of a non-stock company had the 
legal authority to adopt a fee-shifting bylaw. It observed that fee-shifting 
bylaws were consistent with (or not inconsistent with) the common law, 
the company’s charter, and Delaware law.99 With respect to Delaware law, 
the ATP court held that fee-shifting bylaws were allowed under the DGCL 
because neither that law nor any other Delaware law forbid fee-shifting 
bylaws. Additionally, the court explained that “allocat[ing] risk among 
parties in intra-corporate litigation . . . ‘relat[es] to the business of the 
corporation, the conduct of its affairs,’” and the rights of the company’s 
shareholders or managers.
100
  
It is important to emphasize the limited nature of ATP’s holding. ATP 
upheld only the facial validity of fee-shifting bylaws.
101
 By addressing a 
facial challenge, ATP analyzed only whether in all cases, the bylaw would 
operate inconsistent with Delaware law.
102
 Facial invalidity is a tough 
standard to meet, one that requires fee shifting to be contrary to Delaware 
law in every conceivable circumstance.
103
 If there is but one legitimate, 
conceivable way in which the fee-shifting bylaw could operate consistent 
with Delaware law, then that bylaw is facially valid.
104
 Thus, in the context 
of a facial challenge, it is unsurprising that ATP concluded that corporate 
managers had the legal authority to adopt a fee-shifting bylaw that might, 
in the right case, apply permissibly.  
 
 
 99. See id. at 558 (“Neither the DGCL nor any other Delaware statute forbids the enactment of 
fee-shifting bylaws. . . . [A] fee-shifting bylaw would not be prohibited under Delaware common 
law.”).  
 100. Id. (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b)).  
 101. See id. at 555 (“[W]e cannot directly address the bylaw at issue . . . .”); id. at 558 (“A fee-
shifting bylaw, like the one described . . . is facially valid.”). ATP specifically refrained from assessing 
whether the bylaw at issue in the case was adopted for a proper or improper purpose. See id. at 559 
(“The Certification does not provide the stipulated facts necessary to determine whether the ATP 
bylaw was enacted for a proper purpose or properly applied.”).  
 102. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 261 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a facial challenge as a “claim 
that a statute is unconstitutional on its face — that is, that it always operates unconstitutionally”). 
 103. See, e.g., Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 940 (Del. Ch. 
2013) (footnote omitted) (“By challenging the facial statutory and contractual validity of the forum 
selection bylaws, the plaintiffs took on the stringent task of showing that the bylaws cannot operate 
validly in any conceivable circumstance. The plaintiffs cannot evade this burden by conjuring up 
imagined future situations where the bylaws might operate unreasonably, especially when they 
acknowledge that in most internal affairs cases the bylaws will not operate in an unreasonable 
manner.”).  
 104. Id. at 948 (citing Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401, 407 (Del. 1985)) (“[T]he 
plaintiffs’ burden on this motion challenging the facial statutory and contractual validity of the bylaws 
is a difficult one: they must show that the bylaws cannot operate lawfully or equitably under any 
circumstances.”). 
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In the absence of an explicit limit on that authority ultimately enacted 
by the Delaware legislature, the court’s conclusion that management has 
broad power to adopt fee-shifting bylaws was consistent with the 
Delaware Way, and unremarkable. In fact, it would have been surprising if 
the court in ATP had found that adopting the bylaw was beyond the power 
assigned to the board of directors. Delaware statutory law imposes 
precious few limits on director power—authorizing the issuance of shares 
for less than par value, which is really an obsolete limit in light of the 
DGCL’s authorization of the issuance of no-par stock;105 authorizing 
dividends to shareholders in the context of insolvency, which is subject to 
strong reliance defenses;
106
 and deciding to cause the corporation to 
indemnify directors from a judgment entered against them, but even that 
patent self-dealing is not unlawful if done with the approval of the Court 
of Chancery.
107
 
Second, ATP held that adopting and enforcing a legally permissible 
bylaw would still be policed by courts of equity to ensure that the adoption 
and invocation of that bylaw was consistent with the directors’ fiduciary 
obligations—the other component of the Delaware Way.108 And this 
means that the Delaware courts must craft the appropriate tools by which 
to measure fee-shifting bylaws and “separate the good, the bad and the 
ugly.”109  
ATP went out of its way to remind us that a fee-shifting bylaw, and 
indeed any bylaw—even if lawful on its face under Delaware corporate 
law—must nonetheless be enjoined as invalid if it was adopted for an 
improper purpose, invoked for an improper purpose, adopted in a way that 
was not equitable under the circumstances, or invoked in a way that was 
not equitable under the circumstances. ATP said that “[w]hether the 
specific . . . fee-shifting bylaw is enforceable . . . depends on the manner in 
which it was adopted and the circumstances under which it was invoked. 
Bylaws that may otherwise be facially valid will not be enforced if 
adopted or used for an inequitable purpose.”110  
 
 
 105. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a) (2015). 
 106. Id. §§ 141(e), 172. 
 107. Id. § 145(b). 
 108. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 558 (Del. 2014); see also Coffee, 
supra note 22, at 5 (“The Delaware courts have a long history of holding that powers legitimately 
possessed by the corporation may still not be used for an improper purpose.”); Mirvis & Savitt, supra 
note 70, at 12 (“ATP itself . . . full well recognized that equitable scrutiny is inherently a part of the 
analysis.”).  
 109. Mirvis & Savitt, supra note 70, at 12.  
 110. ATP, 91 A.3d at 558; see also id. at 560 (“Legally permissible bylaws adopted for an 
improper purpose are unenforceable in equity.”); Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss2/9
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In this critical language, ATP cited the precise passage from Schnell 
that, as Chief Justice Strine wrote nearly ten years earlier, captured the 
essence of the Delaware Way
111—a broad grant of legal authority is 
constrained by shareholders’ fundamental rights and principles of 
equity.
112
 ATP stated that the enforceability of a fee-shifting bylaw will 
“turn on the circumstances surrounding its adoption and use.”113 This 
critical language incorporated by reference the body of settled Delaware 
case law providing a template for the judicial analysis of board action in 
just these kinds of circumstances. Under that case law, a board’s decisions 
to adopt or invoke a fee-shifting bylaw cannot be enforced unless the 
board establishes that those decisions satisfied its fiduciary duties.  
IV. FEE-SHIFTING BYLAWS UNDER THE DELAWARE WAY AND A 
TEMPLATE FOR EQUITABLE LIMITS ON BYLAWS GENERALLY 
To illustrate the equitable limits on bylaws generally, we consider what 
kind of bylaw would be consistent with equitable principles and adopted 
and used for a proper purpose. We think the only kind of bylaw that is 
likely to survive such scrutiny is one that is proportionate. In the particular 
context of fee-shifting bylaws, a proportionate bylaw is one that provides a 
mechanism for a neutral arbiter to award two-way shifting of reasonable 
fees in response to frivolous litigation tactics. 
A. The Unocal Standard of Review Governs Bylaws Tainted by the 
Omnipresent Specter of Self-Interest 
At the threshold, bylaws enacted in circumstances where the board of 
directors is inherently self-interested should be governed by the Unocal 
 
 
73 A.3d 934, 949 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“The answer to the possibility that a statutorily and contractually 
valid bylaw may operate inequitably in a particular scenario is for the party facing a concrete situation 
to challenge the case-specific application of the bylaw, as in the landmark case of Schnell v. Chris–
Craft Industries.”). 
 111. Strine, If Corporate Action Is Lawful, supra note 70, at 881. 
 112. ATP cited examples of bylaws found not enforceable because they were adopted to 
perpetuate directors in office or disenfranchise members, otherwise inequitable purposes. ATP, 91 
A.3d at 557–59. The court cited Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971), which 
refused to enforce a bylaw adopted by the board of directors that would block shareholder voting and 
perpetuate directors in office. Next, the court cited Hollinger International, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 
1022 (Del. Ch. 2004), which refused to enforce a bylaw adopted by the board of directors that would 
have the practical effect of disenfranchising other stockholders. Finally, the court cited Frantz Mfg. 
Co. v. EAC Industries, 501 A.2d 401 (Del. 1985), which enforced a bylaw because it would avoid 
disenfranchising shareholders. 
 113. ATP, 91 A.3d at 559.  
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standard of review, which is an exception to the traditional business 
judgment rule. So too with fee-shifting bylaws. 
Equitable review examines whether managers complied with their 
fiduciary obligations, including the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.
114
 
If the company’s managers’ conduct breaches of either duty, then the 
Chancery Court can enjoin that conduct.
115
 When reviewing the actions of 
directors, Delaware courts traditionally employ the business judgment 
rule. Under that rule, a Delaware court will presume that the board’s 
business decisions are informed, made in good faith, and made “in the 
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the 
company.”116  
But in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
117
 the Delaware Supreme 
Court recognized that certain scenarios in which a board exercises its 
judgment present an “omnipresent specter that [the] board may be acting 
primarily in its own interests.” In cases where board members have this 
kind of an inherent conflict, “there is an enhanced duty which calls for 
judicial examination at the threshold before the protections of the business 
judgment rule may be conferred.”118 In Unocal, the Delaware Supreme 
Court developed the framework for this threshold judicial examination. 
Under that framework, a board of directors must show that: (1) it had 
“reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and 
effectiveness existed”; and (2) the “defensive measure” adopted in 
response was “reasonable in relation to the threat posed.”119 Unocal 
involved defensive measures adopted to counter a hostile takeover, but the 
 
 
 114. See, e.g., Allen et al., supra note 85, at 1289–91 (describing the duties of care and loyalty and 
the three categories of cases in which these concepts have been primarily used); Grundfest & Savelle, 
supra note 40, at 400 (stating that Delaware courts must consider whether a forum-selection bylaw 
would “violate the fiduciary duties that the board owes to stockholders and to the corporation” under 
the facts and circumstances of the case). 
 115. See, e.g., E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Am. Potash & Chem. Corp., 200 A.2d 428, 432 
(Del. Ch. 1964) (stating that it is “well-recognized” that “equity will enjoin a threatened breach of 
fiduciary duty”). 
 116. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citations omitted).  
 117. 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985). Although Delaware law allows directors to limit monetary 
liability for breaches of the duty of care, Delaware law does not extend those limits to breaches of the 
duty of loyalty or to requests for injunctive relief. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7); see also In re 
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 752 (Del. Ch. 2005) (citing Malpiede v. Townson, 
780 A.2d 1075, 1095 (Del. 2001)) (“The existence of an exculpation provision authorized by 
§ 102(b)(7) does not, however, eliminate a director’s fiduciary duty of care, because a court may still 
grant injunctive relief for violations of that duty.”). 
 118. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. 
 119. Id. at 955–56 (citations omitted); see also Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 
1356 (Del. 1985).  
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Delaware courts have extended this framework to all defensive measures 
adopted where managers risk losing control of the company.
120
  
Adopting and invoking fee-shifting bylaws presents such a 
circumstance where the omnipresent specter of self-interest taints the 
board’s action and thus must satisfy the test from Unocal. The board has 
three inherent interests in stemming all shareholder litigation, merited or 
not.
121
 First, managers have an inherent interest in retaining control of their 
seats on the board or their positions in the company. If claims or evidence 
of misconduct emerge against managers, then these claims or that 
evidence may threaten their positions within the company—forcing 
resignation or emboldening rivals in a challenge for power.
122
 Second, 
directors have an inherent fiscal interest in avoiding shareholder litigation. 
Board members typically have an equitable stake in the company.
123
 
Shareholder and derivative lawsuits, which themselves often follow a drop 
in the company’s stock price, usually trigger a further dip in the 
 
 
 120. See, e.g., Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 82 (Del. 1992) (quoting Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 575 
A.2d 1131, 1144 (Del. 1990)) (stating that Unocal applies to any defensive measure “touch[ing] upon 
issues of control”); Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 320 (Del. Ch. 2000) (footnote omitted) 
(“[I]n Stroud v. Grace, the Delaware Supreme Court held that Unocal must be applied to any 
defensive measure touching upon issues of control, regardless of whether that measure also implicates 
voting rights.”).  
 121. Others have characterized the “conflict of interest that comes with allowing directors to adopt 
bylaws that insulate their own behavior from legal challenge” as “obvious.” Brown, supra note 13, at 
21. And some law firms have warned clients that just by adopting those bylaws, directors could expose 
themselves to a lawsuit for breach of the duty of loyalty. See Corporate Alert, Nicholas O’Keefe & 
Natasha Y. Hsieh, Kaye Scholer LLP, 2015 Proxy Season: Should Companies Propose Exclusive 
Forum and Fee-Shifting Charter Amendments at Their 2015 Annual Shareholder Meetings? (Dec. 18, 
2014), available at http://www.kayescholer.com/in-the-market/publications/client_alerts/20141218-
corporate-alert-2015-proxy-season-should-companies-propose-exclusive-forum-and-fee-shifting-charter-
amendments-at-their-2015-annual-shareholder-meetings/_res/id=sa_File1/Corporate%20Alert_2015% 
20Proxy%20Season_Should%20Companies%20Propose%20Exclusive%20Forum%20and%20Fee-
Shifting%20Charter%20Amendments.pdf (“Adoption of [fee-shifting provisions] could be viewed as a 
breach of the duty of loyalty, given the possibility that the provisions may immunize questionable 
board conduct from challenge by plaintiffs’ lawyers.”).  
 122. See, e.g., In re China Agritech, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 7163–VCL, 2013 
WL 2181514, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2013) (observing that six outside directors and two senior 
officers resigned after claims of mismanagement surfaced); Edgewater Growth Capital Partners LP v. 
H.I.G. Capital, Inc., 68 A.3d 197, 207 (Del. Ch. 2013) (observing that because of claims of 
mismanagement, senior leaders “drew a line in the sand,” refusing further funding unless certain 
directors resigned).  
 123. See, e.g., Katherine M. Brown, New Demands, Better Boards: Rethinking Director 
Compensation in an Era of Heightened Corporate Governance, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1102, 1122 & 
n.128 (2007) (citing NAT’L ASS’N OF CORPORATE DIRS. BLUE RIBBON COMM’N, DIRECTOR 
COMPENSATION: PURPOSES, PRINCIPLES, AND BEST PRACTICES vii (2001), and observing that 
“[n]early all of the largest companies in the United States use equity in the company as some part of 
their directors’ compensation package”).  
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company’s stock price.124 Third, by avoiding litigation, managers keep 
their reputations unsullied. Shareholder and derivative litigation calls 
managers’ performance or judgment into question. Certainly, managers 
wish to avoid all claims of mismanagement—merited or not.125  
B. Under Unocal, The Bylaw Must Be Proportionate and Reasonable in 
Relation to a Legitimate Threat to Corporate Welfare 
Under Unocal, a defensive measure must be a proportional response to 
a legitimate threat to corporate or shareholder welfare.
126
 This inquiry has 
two aspects: (1) a legitimate threat; and (2) proportionality and 
reasonableness—both of which limit the application of a company’s 
bylaws.  
1. A Legitimate Threat 
Turning to the first limit on bylaws, there must be a legitimate threat, 
not to the directors’ ability to control the company, but to corporate or 
 
 
 124. See, e.g., Stephen P. Ferris & A.C. Pritchard, Stock Price Reactions to Securities Fraud Class 
Actions Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 3 (Univ. of Mich. John M. Olin Ctr. for 
Law & Econ., Paper No. 01-009, 2001), available at http://www.law.umich.edu/centersandprograms/ 
lawandeconomics/abstracts/2001/documents/pritchard01-09.pdf (finding a “strong negative price 
reaction of approximately 25% around the revelation date of the bad news spawning the lawsuit. The 
reaction to the subsequent event, the notice of suit filing is much smaller, but remains statistically 
significant”).  
 125. See, e.g., Seinfeld v. Coker, 847 A.2d 330, 333 (Del. Ch. 2000) (recognizing the importance 
of shareholder litigation as a mechanism to deter improper behavior by directors and managers “who 
want to avoid the expense of being sued and the sometimes larger reputational expense of losing in 
court”); Barbara Black, Reputational Damages in Securities Litigation, 35 J. CORP. L. 169, 174–75 
(2009) (discussing how challenges to a company’s internal controls and its managers’ reputation for 
integrity “can have a profound effect on future cash flows”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the 
Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through 
Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 718 (1986) (noting that directors fear damaged 
reputations from shareholder derivative litigation); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The 
Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and 
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 35 (1991) (“Directors usually own some stock in 
their corporations and are interested in preserving their reputational capital by not being associated 
with firms that perform poorly.”).  
 126. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955–56 (Del. 1985) (citing Cheff v. 
Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554–55 (Del. 1964)) (“The standard of proof . . . is designed to ensure that a 
defensive measure to thwart or impede a takeover is indeed motivated by a good faith concern for the 
welfare of the corporation and its stockholders, which in all circumstances must be free of any fraud or 
other misconduct. . . . A further aspect is the element of balance. If a defensive measure is to come 
within the ambit of the business judgment rule, it must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed.”).  
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shareholder welfare.
127
 Thus, a bylaw that does not target a legitimate 
threat to corporate or shareholder welfare is invalid.  
Three examples—cited by ATP—illustrate this principle. Schnell v. 
Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.
128
 is the first example of a legal but equitably 
improper bylaw. In Schnell, the board of directors adopted a bylaw 
advancing the date of an annual stockholder meeting. The bylaw was not 
aimed at any threat to corporate or shareholder welfare, but was instead 
aimed at “obstructing the legitimate efforts of dissident stockholders in the 
exercise of their rights to undertake a proxy contest against management” 
and to “perpetuat[e]” managers in office.129  
Another example is Hollinger International, Inc. v. Black,
130
 where a 
controlling shareholder enacted a bylaw that prevented the board of 
directors from acting “on any matter of significance except by unanimous 
vote” and set the board’s quorum requirement at 80%. Just as in Schnell, 
there was no threat to the company’s welfare that justified such a 
defensive measure by the controlling shareholder, and thus the bylaw was 
invalid.
131
  
The third example illustrates the converse of this principle: a bylaw 
aimed at a legitimate threat will not be overturned judicially. In Frantz 
Manufacturing Co. v. EAC Industries, the Delaware Supreme Court 
upheld a bylaw that limited anti-takeover maneuvering after a majority 
stockholder gained control of the company. That bylaw was aimed at a 
legitimate threat to shareholder welfare: an “attempt to avoid . . . 
disenfranchisement as a majority shareholder.”132  
Forum-selection bylaws provide a more recent example of bylaws with 
a valid corporate purpose. Forum-selection bylaws aim to solve the issue 
of multi-forum litigation, which is detrimental to the plaintiff class, 
defendants, and the judicial system. No court—Delaware or otherwise—
has found this to be an improper purpose.
133
 
 
 
 127. Legitimate threats to corporate welfare include, for example, derailing the company’s long-
term strategy, losing the opportunity to formulate or present a potentially superior alternative, 
inadequacy of consideration offered to shareholders, or the risk of shareholder confusion or coercion. 
See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1989); Air Prods. & 
Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 107–08 (Del. Ch. 2011).  
 128. 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971). 
 129. Id. at 439. 
 130. 844 A.2d 1022, 1077 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
 131. Id. at 1081–82. 
 132. 501 A.2d 401, 407 (Del. 1985). 
 133. See, e.g., City of Providence v. First Citizens BancShares, Inc., 99 A.3d 229, 239–41 (Del. 
Ch. 2014) (observing that forum-selection bylaws spare courts from the need to divine the appropriate 
forum and do not advance directors’ self-interest by having claims in a single forum); North v. 
McNamara, 47 F. Supp. 3d 635, 645 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (stating that forum-selection bylaws achieve 
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2. Reasonableness and Proportionality 
Turning to the second limit on bylaws tainted by the omnipresent 
specter of self-interest, not only must the bylaw target a legitimate threat, 
but it must also be a reasonable and proportionate comeback to that threat. 
A defensive measure is disproportionate if it is “draconian (coercive or 
preclusive) or falls outside a range of reasonable responses.”134  
Again, forum-selection bylaws provide a recent example of a bylaw 
that is reasonable and proportional to the identified threat to corporate 
welfare. Forum-selection bylaws are designed to avoid the inefficiencies 
and waste that accompany litigating the same case in several courts. 
Forum-selection bylaws that designate a single forum in which to sue are 
reasonable and proportional measures to that threat because these bylaws 
merely regulate “where stockholders may file suit, not whether the 
stockholder may file suit or the kind of remedy that the stockholder may 
obtain” if the stockholder does sue.135 
C. Applying Unocal to Fee-Shifting Bylaws 
How then does Unocal affect fee-shifting bylaws? We think that under 
a Unocal standard, as applied by the many courts outside of Delaware that 
follow Delaware corporate law, the universe in which fee-shifting bylaws 
would be consistent with settled equitable principles is, in fact, quite 
limited. In our view, a proportionate and reasonable fee-shifting bylaw 
that responds to a legitimate threat to corporate welfare is one that 
provides for two-way shifting of reasonable fees for frivolous litigation as 
determined by a neutral arbiter. Accordingly, in those states that rely upon 
Delaware corporate law, the courts will apply the Delaware Way and 
refuse to enforce any fee-shifting bylaw that does not provide for two-way 
shifting of reasonable fees for frivolous litigation as determined by a 
neutral arbiter.  
1. Frivolous Litigation 
To start, fee-shifting bylaws will likely survive equitable scrutiny only 
where they target frivolous litigation. A fee-shifting bylaw that shifts fees 
 
 
“cost and efficiency benefits that inure to the corporation and its shareholders by streamlining 
litigation into a single forum”).  
 134. Allen et al., supra note 85, at 1309. 
 135. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 952 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
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in merited cases is likely either disproportionate or not aimed at a 
legitimate threat.  
Fee-shifting bylaws must distinguish between legitimate and frivolous 
shareholder suits.
136
 As a rule, fee-shifting bylaws must respond to a 
legitimate threat to corporate or shareholder welfare. Fee-shifting bylaws 
are often advanced as responses to the threat shareholder lawsuits present 
to corporate coffers.
137
 But not all litigation poses a threat to corporate or 
shareholder welfare. In fact, by enabling equitable review of managers’ 
actions, shareholder litigation gives shareholders a powerful tool to protect 
their welfare and, as the Delaware Way recognizes, constrain the broad 
legal authority Delaware law invests in managers.
138
 Only frivolous 
litigation causes the company to expend money when it should not. This 
kind of litigation wastes management’s time and diverts resources from 
the company’s business activities.139  
ATP itself did not endorse fee shifting in every case. Apart from 
resolving a mere facial challenge,
140
 ATP did not say that deterring 
litigation is always proper. In a confusing double negative, ATP said only 
that deterring litigation is not “invariably” improper.141 Put differently, 
ATP said that there could be instances when deterring litigation is 
permissible, but also instances when deterring litigation is not.
142
  
Practically speaking, however, directors will almost always justify fee-
shifting bylaws as counters to frivolous litigation only, not all shareholder 
 
 
 136. See Harvey L. Pitt, Reducing Litigation Perils Fairly, 53 BANK & CORP. GOVERNANCE L. 
REP. 22, 26, 28 (2014) (“Ideally, any by-law provision adopted should distinguish between frivolous 
litigation and frivolous litigation practices, on the one hand, and meritorious claims.”). 
 137. See, e.g., The Case for Allowing Fee Shifting Bylaws as a Privately Ordered Solution to the 
Shareholder Litigation Epidemic, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www. 
professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2014/11/the-case-for-allowing-fee-shifting-bylaws-
as-a-privately-ordered-solution-to-the-shareholder-litigat.html, archived at http://perma.cc/55SE-A24Y. 
 138. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) (“The machinery of corporate 
democracy and the derivative suit are potent tools to redress the conduct of a torpid and unfaithful 
management.”), overruled by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); accord Rales v. Blasband, 
634 A.2d 927, 933 (Del. 1993) (quoting Aronson’s language). 
 139. See Griffith, supra note 54, at 30 (“The problem with current fee-shifting proposals is not 
that they deter shareholder litigation, but that they deter it indiscriminately. The extreme loser-pays 
position of current bylaw proposals takes no account of the merits of the underlying claim . . . .”); Pitt, 
supra note 136, at 28 (similar). 
 140. See ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 559–60 (Del. 2014). 
 141. See id. at 560 (“The intent to deter litigation . . . is not invariably [read, in every case or on 
every occasion] an improper purpose.”). Many overread this point and contend that ATP says that 
deterring litigation of any kind is always permissible. See, e.g., Robert W. Gaffey et al., Break Point? 
Delaware Supreme Court Upholds Validity of Fee-Shifting Bylaw, 18 WALL ST. LAW. 16, 17 (2014) 
(“Importantly, the court noted that the intent to deter litigation is not, standing alone, an improper 
purpose.”).  
 142. ATP Tour, Inc., 91 A.3d at 560. 
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litigation. The reason being, if the board of directors’ primary purpose for 
adopting or invoking a fee-shifting bylaw is to impair or impede legitimate 
shareholder litigation, then the bylaw is most certainly doomed, as the 
board must offer a compelling justification for it. Delaware courts have 
recognized that the burden of showing a compelling justification is “quite 
onerous,”143 and its application “comes close to being outcome-
determinative in and of itself.”144  
To explain why a bylaw that indiscriminately targets litigation would 
require a compelling justification, under Delaware case law, when the 
board of directors uses defensive measures primarily to interfere with 
fundamental shareholder rights, such as the voting franchise, then the 
board’s justification for that defensive measure must be compelling.145 In 
Schnell, for instance, the Delaware Supreme Court held that a board’s 
rescheduling of an annual meeting, although consistent with the letter of 
Delaware law, was done to “perpetuat[e] [directors] . . . in office” and “for 
the purpose of obstructing the legitimate efforts of dissident stockholders 
in the exercise of their rights to undertake a proxy contest against 
management.”146 These, the court said, “are inequitable purposes.”147  
Just as board action primarily used to interfere with fundamental 
shareholder rights (e.g., shareholder voting) requires a compelling 
justification, so too should board action primarily used to interfere with 
equitable review of board action. Shareholders’ rights are but one of the 
Delaware Way’s two constraints on the broad grant of authority given to 
 
 
 143. Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1376 (Del. 1996).  
 144. Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 320 (Del. Ch. 2000).  
 145. See, e.g., Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 (Del. Ch. 1988); Stroud v. 
Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 92 n.3 (Del. 1992) (citations omitted) (“A board’s unilateral decision to adopt a 
defensive measure touching ‘upon issues of control’ that purposefully disenfranchises its shareholders 
is strongly suspect under Unocal, and cannot be sustained without a ‘compelling justification.’”); see 
also MM Companies, Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1132 (Del. 2003) (citing Stroud, 606 
A.2d at 92 n.3) (“When the primary purpose of a board of directors’ defensive measure is to interfere 
with or impede the effective exercise of the shareholder franchise in a contested election for directors, 
the board must first demonstrate a compelling justification for such action as a condition precedent to 
any judicial consideration of reasonableness and proportionately [sic].”); Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. 
Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1378 (Del. 1995) (citing Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 
637 A.2d 34, 42 n.11 (1994)) (stating that Delaware “has been and remains assiduous in its concern 
about defensive actions designed to thwart the essence of corporate democracy by disenfranchising 
shareholders”); Chesapeake, 771 A.2d at 323 (“[I]t may be optimal simply for Delaware courts to 
infuse our Unocal analyses with the spirit animating Blasius and not hesitate to use our remedial 
powers where an inequitable distortion of corporate democracy has occurred.”).  
 146. Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971). 
 147. Id.; see also State v. Jessup & Moore Paper Co., 77 A. 16, 19–20 (Del. 1910) (striking down 
a bylaw that would “take from the stockholder the right to have the court pass upon the question 
whether he is entitled to the inspection” by forcing the stockholder to make “his first and final appeal 
to the board of directors”). 
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managers of a company, and equitable review of board action is the 
other.
148
 Plainly, fee-shifting bylaws that indiscriminately target 
shareholder litigation present a real impediment to equitable review. 
Before fee shifting can be found inequitable, there must be a case in 
controversy, which itself requires that a claim be brought; but fee-shifting 
bylaws operate to deter claims from ever being brought to begin with.
149
 
Indeed, other Delaware jurists have suggested that bylaws that impede a 
shareholder’s right to sue by, for example, eliminating legal standing, may 
be “per se” inequitable.150  
Unocal’s second prong—reasonableness and proportionality—likewise 
implicitly limits the kinds of cases in which a fee-shifting bylaw may 
apply to only frivolous cases. Not only must fee-shifting bylaws target a 
legitimate threat (i.e., frivolous litigation), they must also be reasonable 
and proportionate responses to that threat. These limits likely foreclose 
any bylaw that demands complete success by the plaintiff.
151
 Plainly, if the 
defendant obtains a small victory on one issue, but the plaintiff otherwise 
prevails, requiring fee shifting for a minor loss is unjustly severe. In fact, 
the Third Circuit already recognized that a bylaw that shifts fees in 
circumstances where the plaintiff does not “substantially achieve” the full 
remedy sought would likely be draconian—“unconscionab[le] or [invalid 
under] public policy considerations.”152  
2. Reasonable Fees 
Along with proportionality, the next constraint on fee-shifting bylaws 
is reasonableness. To that end, a bylaw that transfers anything other than 
“reasonable” fees is not a reasonable response to any legitimate threat that 
frivolous litigation poses to the corporation. 
As an initial matter, limiting fees to reasonable fees is consistent with 
general contract law. In cases of contractual fee shifting, which, according 
 
 
 148. See EMAK Worldwide, Inc. v. Kurz, 50 A.3d 429, 433 (Del. 2012) (describing shareholder 
voting rights as “sacrosanct” in the context of director elections and describing them as a “fundamental 
governance right”); Lonergan v. EPE Holdings LLC, 5 A.3d 1008, 1018 (Del. Ch. 2010) (stating that 
“[f]iduciary duty review empowers courts to determine how a governance scheme should operate”); 
Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 932 (Del. 1993) (“The stockholder derivative suit is an important 
and unique feature of corporate governance.”). 
 149. Griffith, supra note 54, at 35. 
 150. Ridgely, supra note 13, at 23. 
 151. See Coffee, supra note 22, at 5 (“[E]ven if attempting to discourage frivolous litigation seems 
fair enough, the analysis changes when a bylaw or charter provision demands complete success. Then, 
it seemingly moves beyond a proper purpose and intentionally seeks to discourage meritorious 
litigation.”). 
 152. Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour Inc., 480 F. App’x 124, 127 n.4 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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to ATP is the species of fee shifting contained in a company’s bylaws, the 
fees and costs shifted must be reasonable.
153
 To assess a fee’s 
reasonableness, case law directs a judge to consider several factors, 
including customary fees for similar legal services and the results 
obtained.
154
  
A component of reasonableness is that the bylaw is a proportional 
countermeasure, which means it must not be either preclusive or 
coercive.
155
 To avoid precluding shareholder litigation or coercing an 
unfair settlement, the fees that can be shifted must be tailored to the 
specific threat identified (i.e., the threat of frivolous litigation) and shift 
only those fees actually caused by the need to respond to that threat (i.e., 
the frivolous claims).  
Turning to the first aspect, to avoid over-deterrence, fee-shifting 
bylaws should distinguish between representative and non-representative 
litigation. To explain, ATP was non-representative litigation; the plaintiffs 
were suing on behalf of themselves alone.
156
 In contrast, shareholder 
litigation is representative litigation. In representative litigation, the 
plaintiffs are a diversified group and many have no connection to the 
business of the company other than their equity stake. Indiscriminate fee 
shifting, however, would impose liability on an individual litigant for 
representative cases. And without some reasonable cap on fee shifting for 
the named plaintiff, fee shifting forces the plaintiff to shoulder the entire 
cost of representative litigation or forgo a potentially merited challenge.
157
 
This is particularly glaring for shareholders since their personal liability 
for monetary losses is generally limited to the amount of their investment 
in the corporation.
158
 There is near unanimous recognition that no rational 
person would put “half-a-million dollars at risk . . . when their own gain 
will be relatively small”—even if they believe the corporation acted 
improperly.
159
 Requiring a representative litigant to bear individually the 
 
 
 153. See Sternberg v. Nanticoke Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 62 A.3d 1212, 1220–21 (Del. 2013). 
 154. See, e.g., Mahani v. Edix Media Grp., Inc., 935 A.2d 242, 247–48 (Del. 2007). 
 155. See, e.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1367 (Del. 1995). 
 156. In fact, the company that adopted a fee-shifting bylaw in that case was more akin to a 
partnership: ATP operated a professional tennis tour and its members were those who owned and 
operated tennis tournaments.  
 157. See 4 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 
§ 23:6 (3d ed. 2014) (quoting In re Gen. Motors Class H S’holders Litig., 734 A.2d 611, 621 (Del. Ch. 
1999)) (stating that coercion is “when the shareholder is forced into ‘a choice between a new position 
and a compromised position for reasons other than those related to the economic merits of the 
decision’”).  
 158. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(6).  
 159. Jeff Mordock, Delaware Legislation Could Bar Litigation Fee-Shifting Bylaws, DEL. BUS. 
CT. INSIDER, June 2014, at 1, 1 (quoting Professor Lawrence A. Hamermesh as stating, “[w]hy would 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss2/9
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risk and cost of an unsuccessful suit “almost certainly will kill shareholder 
litigation.”160 The problem indiscriminate fees pose is further illustrated 
when one considers how the risk of those fees would influence the motives 
of lead plaintiffs and lead counsel at settlement. Lead plaintiffs and lead 
counsel would face enormous pressure to settle rather than take the risk of 
any loss, effectively placing their interests in conflict with the class they 
purport to serve.
161
 
Turning to the second aspect, fee-shifting bylaws must limit fees 
shifted to those actually caused by the need to defend against frivolous 
claims. Suppose the plaintiff files three claims, and the first claim is 
frivolous while the other two have merit. Also assume that the defendant 
spent $250,000 in fees to dismiss quickly the first claim at the pleading 
stage, but then incurs $1,000,000 in additional fees to successfully litigate 
the remaining two claims at trial. Theoretically, only $250,000 of the 
defendants’ fees were actually caused by the existence of the frivolous 
claim. The additional $1,000,000, however, appear unrelated to the 
frivolous claim, and that portion of the fees then is unrelated to any threat 
posed by that claim. To require the plaintiff to pay all of the defendants’ 
fees in that situation is simply to give the defendants a windfall and 
provide a disproportionate response to any legitimate threat from frivolous 
litigation.   
 
 
a rational person put half-a-million dollars at risk in corporate litigation when their own gain will be 
relatively small? Even if you thought a corporation acted improperly, what if you were wrong? You 
would get hammered with legal fees.”); see also Brown, supra note 13, at 24 (“[S]hareholders have 
little incentive to step forward where they also bear the risk of liability for the fees incurred by the 
company and its directors.”); Griffith, supra note 54, at 3 (observing that fee-shifting imposed on 
representative litigants makes representative litigation “economically irrational, even in cases 
involving potentially significant recoveries”); Hamermesh, supra note 86, at 171 (“[S]uch a bylaw is 
one that is essentially self-enforcing: even if there were some evidence that its adoption was 
improperly motivated, a lawsuit challenging it would likely be too risky for any stockholder to 
undertake because anything less than total success in that litigation would result in the stockholder 
having to pay the corporation’s costs of defense.”); Strougo v. Hollander, 111 A.3d 590, 595 (Del. Ch. 
2015) (“[I]n my view, no rational stockholder—and no rational plaintiff’s lawyer—would risk having 
to pay the Defendants’ uncapped attorneys’ fees to vindicate the rights of the Company’s minority 
stockholders, even though the Reverse Stock Split appears to be precisely the type of transaction that 
should be subject to Delaware’s most exacting standard of review to protect against fiduciary 
misconduct.”). 
 160. Griffith, supra note 54, at 29 (“Whatever the effects of a move to fee-shifting may be in other 
contexts, it almost certainly will kill shareholder litigation because it would force representative 
litigants to bear individual responsibility for the full cost of an unsuccessful suit.”). 
 161. See, e.g., Marc I. Gross, Loser-Pays—Or Whose “Fault” Is It Anyway: A Response to 
Hensler-Rowe’s “Beyond ‘It Just Ain’t Worth It,’” 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 163, 168 (2001) 
(discussing this dynamic in the context of fee-shifting in securities litigation). 
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3. Two-Way Fee Shifting 
Not only must fee shifting be limited to the transfer of reasonable fees 
and only for frivolous litigation tactics, but fee shifting should also be 
bilateral.
162 Otherwise, a bylaw that shifts fees one way may not be a 
reasonable retort to the threat posed.  
If the threat posed to the company is the threat of incurring costs of 
frivolous litigation, then the bylaw should target all sources of frivolous 
litigation. A one-way bylaw prevents frivolous litigation by only the 
shareholder plaintiff. But we know that corporate directors may raise 
frivolous defenses or engage in frivolous litigation tactics just as easily.
163
 
Two-way fee shifting tempers both sides’ expenses on legal fees and 
discourages each side from taking questionable legal stands.  
4. Neutral Arbiter 
Equally important to the limits on fee-shifting bylaws of frivolousness 
and reasonableness is who decides whether the fees shifted (to either 
party) are reasonable or the litigation frivolous. Allowing the board of 
directors to decide the amount of fees and whether a legal challenge is 
frivolous seems to prove the maxim that no man ought to be the judge in 
his own case.
164
 Certainly, Delaware law generally avoids that approach, 
requiring instead that “[t]he key to upholding an interested transaction is 
the approval of some neutral decision-making body.”165  
Delaware law suggests four potential neutral arbiters: independent 
directors, a committee with some independent directors, independent 
 
 
 162. See Pitt, supra note 136, at 28 (recommending that “fee-shifting should be two-sided, [not] 
one-sided, permitting plaintiffs’ fees and expenses to be borne by the Company in the event of 
untoward litigation postures taken on the Company’s behalf or at its behest”). 
 163. See Richard L. Marcus, Reassessing the Magnetic Pull of Megacases on Procedure, 51 
DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 470 (2001) (observing that “defendants [may] use ‘dump truck’ discovery 
responses as methods of overwhelming their adversaries,” and that businesses in litigation may stake 
out aggressive litigation positions and pursue similarly aggressive litigation tactics); Linda S. 
Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the 
Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1401–02 (1994) (stating that 
corporate defendants sometimes “withhold necessary evidence or inundate requesting plaintiffs with 
thousands of documents (in either instance, imposing extra cost, harassment, and delay on requesting 
plaintiffs),” and that “[w]hen discovery abuse occurs, it seems equally likely to be an attempt by a 
corporate defendant to bankrupt a plaintiff and to induce abandonment of the lawsuit as a plaintiff’s 
attempt to harass a defendant”).  
 164. See Dr. Bonham’s Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (C.P.) 646, 652; 8 Co. Rep. 107 a, 114 a, 
118 a.  
 165. Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1379 n.23 (Del. 1996) (quoting Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 
445, 467 (Del. 1991)).  
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shareholders, or a court. For instance, to ratify corporate transactions in 
which directors are interested, that decision must be ratified by a majority 
of independent directors, a committee of at least two independent 
directors, or a vote of the majority of shares held by independent 
shareholders.
166
 Additionally, Delaware law allows the board of directors 
to adopt a bylaw indemnifying itself—even in cases where the board is 
found liable for some wrongdoing against the company—but before the 
board may be indemnified, the Court of Chancery or the court in which the 
action is pending must deem it proper.
167
  
For fee-shifting bylaws, the only arbiter that is reliably neutral would 
be a court. For reasons explained, directors are inherently interested in 
stemming shareholder litigation, and hence those directors, or a committee 
consisting of some of those directors, cannot ratify the decision—
independent directors do not exist in that situation. For shareholders, apart 
from the logistical challenge in coordinating shareholders to determine 
frivolousness and the reasonableness of fees, there is also the challenge 
that shareholders may never be disinterested in cases of two-way fee 
shifting. In cases with two-way fee shifting, existing shareholders would 
always want to shift fees away from the company to protect their 
investment. If those existing shareholders were also plaintiffs, then they 
would always want to shift fees to management out of their own self-
interest. Thus, the board, a committee consisting of board members, and 
shareholders will generally lack the neutrality required. Accordingly, as is 
true of the decision whether the corporation should indemnify its own 
directors for expenses incurred by them when they lose a lawsuit to their 
own corporation, the only legitimate disinterested arbiter of fee shifting 
would be the court.  
V. EQUITABLY APPROPRIATE FEE-SHIFTING BYLAWS AND FEE SHIFTING 
UNDER DELAWARE RULE 11  
As we have shown, the only equitably appropriate fee-shifting bylaws 
are those that provide for two-way shifting of reasonable fees in response 
 
 
 166. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144.  
 167. Id. § 145(b); see also Carlson v. Hallinan, 925 A.2d 506, 542 n.240 (Del. Ch. 2006) 
(recognizing that the board of directors may authorize indemnification for itself in cases of 
“wrongdoing and liability” with court approval, but denying approval in that case); Active Asset 
Recovery, Inc. v. Real Estate Asset Recovery Servs., Inc., No. Civ.A. 15478, 1999 WL 743479, at *19 
(Del. Ch. Sept. 10, 1999) (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b)) (acknowledging the “strict[] 
conditions” placed on the right of the board to indemnify itself when it has been held liable to the 
company).  
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to frivolous litigation as determined by a neutral arbiter. And, it turns out, 
Delaware law, and the law of every state, already provides for just this sort 
of mechanism. Rule of Procedure 11 in Delaware, and virtually identical 
provisions in the procedural rules of the federal courts and many states, 
provides a neutral mechanism for two-way shifting of reasonable fees as a 
response to frivolous litigation tactics as determined by a neutral arbiter.
168
 
Delaware Rule 11 overlaps with the three key features of equitably 
appropriate fee-shifting bylaws. 
First, just as fee-shifting bylaws are limited to instances of frivolous 
litigation, so too are sanctions under Rule 11 permissible only in cases of 
frivolous litigation.
169
 Sanctions are only appropriate after a finding that 
one has violated Rule 11.
170
 Explicit in Rule 11 is that by signing a 
pleading and submitting it to the court, the attorney certifies that it is not 
presented for an improper purpose, the legal claims are warranted, and the 
factual allegations have evidentiary support.
171
  
Second, just as fee-shifting bylaws shift only reasonable fees, so too 
does Rule 11 allow courts to impose only reasonable sanctions. For 
example, Delaware Rule 11 specifies that sanctions may consist of “some 
or all of the reasonable attorneys’ fees and other expenses incurred as a 
direct result of the violation.”172 That rule also explicitly limits sanctions 
“to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable 
conduct by others similarly situated.”173 Indeed, the federal Rule 11 
specifically contemplates limiting fees and expenses that can be shifted to 
 
 
 168. John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 354, 379 
(2002/2003) (“Delaware has separate but substantially identical rules of civil procedure for each of its 
three principal systems of courts: the Court of Chancery, the Superior Court, and the inferior civil 
court of non-equitable jurisdiction, the Court of Common Pleas.”). 
 169. See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 21 A.3d 52, 62 (Del. 2011) (citing In re Appeal of 
Infotechnology, Inc., 582 A.2d 215, 221 (Del.1990)) (“Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate to deter and 
punish the bringing of frivolous or meritless claims.”); Fairthorne Maint. Corp. v. Ramunno, C.A. No. 
2124–VCS, 2007 WL 2214318, at *9 (Del. Ch. July 20, 2007) (“[F]ee-shifting awards may be merited 
in exceptional cases in order to deter abusive litigation, avoid harassment, and protect the integrity of 
the judicial process.”); see also Jonathan T. Molot, Fee Shifting and the Free Market, 66 VAND. L. 
REV. 1807, 1816 (2013) (describing Rule 11 as the American system’s mechanism for discouraging 
meritless positions in all types of cases).  
 170. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1) (“If . . . the court [first] determines that Rule 11(b) has been violated, 
[then] the court may impose an appropriate sanction . . . .”).  
 171. Id. at 11(b); DEL. CT. C.P.R. 11(b).  
 172. DEL. CT. C.P.R. 11(c)(2); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4) (stating that sanctions “must be 
limited to what suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly 
situated”). 
 173. DEL. CT. C.P.R. 11(c)(2); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note (1993 
Amendment) (recognizing that a sanctions award for a Rule 11 violation need not be the full amount of 
the other side’s attorneys’ fees and that “partial reimbursement of fees may constitute a sufficient 
deterrent with respect to violations by persons having modest financial resources”).  
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those “directly and unavoidably caused” by just the frivolous aspect of the 
case.
174
  
Third, just as fee-shifting bylaws must allow for two-way fee shifting, 
so too does Rule 11 provide for two-way fee shifting. Rule 11 targets all 
parties, not just plaintiffs. Rule 11 allows for fee shifting, not just for 
plaintiffs or shareholders who bring frivolous suits, but also against 
defendants when they unnecessarily require additional litigation, delay it, 
or assert frivolous motions.
175
 
As a method of deterring frivolous litigation, Rule 11 retains two 
features that may make it more desirable than fee-shifting bylaws. First, 
Rule 11 is the result of years of serious study by respected thinkers on the 
appropriate deterrent for frivolous litigation.
176
 Congress, too, has 
recognized that the inquiry under Rule 11 provides adequate safeguards 
against frivolous litigation. Significantly, before Congress passed the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”), Congress heard 
testimony about the perceived weakness of Rule 11 in curbing frivolous 
securities lawsuits.
177
 It responded to that perception by making a post-
judgment Rule 11 inquiry mandatory in all private securities cases, but, 
importantly, chose not to alter the essential limits on fee shifting imposed 
by Rule 11: frivolousness, reasonableness, and bilateral application.
178
  
 
 
 174. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note (1993 Amendment) (“If, for example, a wholly 
unsupportable count were included in a multi-count complaint or counterclaim for the purpose of 
needlessly increasing the cost of litigation to an impecunious adversary, any award of expenses should 
be limited to those directly caused by inclusion of the improper count, and not those resulting from the 
filing of the complaint or answer itself.”); see also Adams v. Buck-Luce, No. 04 Civ. 1485 (JSR), 
2005 WL 822910, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2005) (holding that under the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act (“PSLRA”), in multi-count complaints, the amount of fees shifted are limited to those 
associated with the frivolous counts only).  
 175. See, e.g., Fairthorne Maint. Corp. v. Ramunno, C.A. No. 2124–VCS, 2007 WL 2214318, at 
*9 (Del. Ch. July 20, 2007). 
 176. See, e.g., Karen Kessler Cain, Comment, Frivolous Litigation, Discretionary Sanctioning and 
a Safe Harbor: The 1993 Revision of Rule 11, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 207, 216 (1994) (observing that the 
1993 amendment to Rule 11 “was enacted after three years of discussion, drafting and debate by all 
facets of the legal community”); see also Nathan R. Sellers, Note, Defending the Formal Federal Civil 
Rulemaking Process: Why the Court Should Not Amend Procedural Rules Through Judicial 
Interpretation, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 327, 328–29 (2011) (explaining that a key feature of the Federal 
Rules is that that they are derived from “public input from a diverse set of constituencies including 
judges, attorneys, legal publications, law schools, professors, and bar associations” and are approved 
by multiple governing bodies).  
 177. See S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 13 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 692 (“Many 
believe that Rule 11 has not been an effective tool in limiting abusive litigation. Complaints about the 
current system include the high cost of making a Rule 11 motion, and the unwillingness of courts to 
impose sanctions, even when the rule is violated.”). 
 178. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c)(2) (2014) (importing Rule 11 into the PSLRA); see also Citibank 
Global Mkts., Inc. v. Rodriguez Santana, 573 F.3d 17, 32 (1st Cir. 2009) (“[T]he PSLRA . . . does not 
alter the standards used to judge compliance with Rule 11.”); Simon DeBartolo Grp., L.P. v. Richard 
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Congress not only refused to alter Rule 11’s traditional limits on fee 
shifting; Congress imported those same limits into the PSLRA. For 
instance, the PSLRA tells courts to presume that attorneys’ fees should be 
shifted when the court finds a violation of Rule 11(b), which defines 
frivolousness.
179
 And the PSLRA explicitly calls for reasonableness and 
proportionality in its sanctions.
180
 Moreover, the PSLRA dictates that 
attorneys’ fees are appropriate sanctions, not only for plaintiffs’ conduct 
(e.g., filing a complaint that substantially violates Rule 11(b)), but also for 
defendants’ conduct (e.g., filing responsive pleadings or dispositive 
motions that violate the Rule).
181
  
In addition, two other equitable limitations on fee-shifting bylaws are 
not present under Rule 11: (1) courts may refuse to enforce any bylaw 
because of the manner in which the board of directors adopted or invoked 
it; and (2) bylaws apply only to those shareholders who “consent” to them. 
These additional equitable limits also apply to all other bylaws that are 
tainted by the specter of self-interest.  
The first such limitation on these bylaws is that a court may refuse to 
enforce them because of the manner in which they were adopted or 
invoked by the board. Under Unocal, the board of directors must show 
that it first adopted a fee-shifting bylaw after careful study, and when it 
later chose to invoke that bylaw, it had reasonable grounds for believing a 
danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed.
182
 In contrast, there is 
no such limit to fee shifting under Rule 11. 
As an example, adopting or invoking a fee-shifting bylaw in the midst 
of litigation—on a so-called “cloudy day”—exposes the bylaw to 
equitable challenge as adopted or invoked without the proper time for 
study. This happened in Roberts v. TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc.,
183
 where 
an Oregon court refused to enforce an exclusive-forum bylaw that was 
adopted at the same board meeting during which the board approved the 
 
 
E. Jacobs Grp., Inc., 186 F.3d 157, 167 (2d Cir. 1999) (“The PSLRA thus does not in any way purport 
to alter the substantive standards for finding a violation of Rule 11 . . . .”). Instead, the PSLRA altered 
the traditional process associated with imposing Rule 11 sanctions. First, the PSLRA makes findings 
on parties’ compliance with Rule 11(b) mandatory upon the final adjudication of a securities-fraud 
case. Second, the PSLRA eliminates the 21-day grace period for correcting violations of Rule 11. 
MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN & JOHN M. WUNDERLICH, RULE 10B-5 PRIVATE SECURITIES FRAUD 
LITIGATION § 13:1 (2015). 
 179. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1)-(4). 
 180. Id. § 78u-4(c)(3)(B)-(C) (allowing the district court to impose some sanction other than fee-
shifting if awarding fees and costs would be unreasonable, unjust, or disproportionate). 
 181. KAUFMAN & WUNDERLICH, supra note 178, § 13:6. 
 182. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). 
 183. No. 1402-02441, 2014 WL 4147465, at *4-5 (Or. Cir. Ct. Aug. 14, 2014). 
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merger that was subject to the underlying suit. The court suggested that it 
would have enforced the bylaw if “the board . . . adopted it prior to any of 
its alleged wrongdoing, and with ample time for the shareholders to accept 
or reject the change.”184 It is no surprise that even as litigators work 
through ATP’s meaning, lawyers advise that the board adopt such a bylaw 
on a clear day.
185
 
The second equitable limit on fee-shifting bylaws—and bylaws 
generally—is that bylaws govern only those shareholders who “consent” 
to them. Rule 11, however, is not so limited. Under the Court of 
Chancery’s Rule 11, the court may sanction the lawyers, the law firms, or 
the parties who violate Rule 11—whether they have consented to the 
possibility of fee shifting or not.
186
 
Defensive tactics can be, and often are, taken solely on the authority of 
the board of directors, without prior approval by the company’s 
shareholders.
187
 But equitable considerations require proper notice and a 
proper procedure so shareholders have an opportunity to review and 
 
 
 184. Id. at *5. But see City of Providence v. First Citizens BancShares, Inc., 99 A.3d 229, 241 
(Del. Ch. 2014) (upholding fee-shifting bylaw adopted on an allegedly “‘cloudy’ day” because 
plaintiffs did not plead any allegations “demonstrating any impropriety in this timing”). 
 185. See, e.g., Alert Memorandum from Cleary Gottlieb, Muscular Bylaws: ATP’s Lessons of 
Continuing Relevance 2 (June 12, 2014), available at http://www.cgsh.com/files/News/e871a487-
ad42-4c24-8bb0-47cecfb08be2/Presentation/NewsAttachment/e595815e-291f-4bf9-8d15-4e0a502489ea/ 
Alert%20Memo%20(PDF%20Version)%202014-51.pdf (“It is surely better to adopt bylaw amendments 
on a ‘clear day,’ without the pressures and exigencies of the moment, and the concern that those 
pressures and exigencies will provide a basis for challenging the validity of those bylaws.”); Alert 
from Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Delaware Supreme Court Endorses “Fee-Shifting” Bylaw in 
Certified Question of Law (May 12, 2014), available at https://www.wsgr.com/ WSGR/Display.aspx? 
SectionName=publications/PDFSearch/wsgralert-fee-shifting.htm (“This sort of bylaw will be less 
susceptible to successful challenge if adopted on a ‘clear day,’ when a board is not facing threatened or 
pending derivative litigation.”); Client Alert from Morrison Foerster, Paradigm Shift? The Delaware 
Supreme Court Allows Bylaw That Shifts Attorneys’ Fees to Loser in Fiduciary Duty Litigation 3 
(May 21, 2014), available at http://www.mofo.com/~/media/Files/ClientAlert/ 140521Paradigm 
Shift.pdf (“If the provision is adopted on a ‘clear day’—well in advance of litigation or the event 
triggering litigation—there is a greater likelihood that the provision will be found to be enforceable.”); 
Theodore N. Mirvis, The Battle Against Multiforum Stockholder Litigation, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON 
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 25, 2014), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2014/08/25/ 
the-battle-against-multiforum-stockholder-litigation/ (“The Oregon rulings, which stray far from 
settled and binding Delaware authority, highlight the indefensible cost and procedural unfairness of 
duplicative multiforum corporate litigation. . . . In light of the TriQuint case and pending further 
elaboration and acceptance of the legal principles governing forum bylaws, however, boards should 
consider adopting such provisions on a ‘clear day’ in advance of any particular anticipated 
litigation.”).  
 186. DEL. CT. C.P.R. 11(c). See also Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enters., 498 U.S. 
533, 547–49 (1991) (holding that Rule 11 applies to parties and their attorneys).  
 187. 4 COX & HAZEN, supra note 157, § 23:5. 
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acquiesce to these terms.
188
 As Professor Lawrence A. Hamermesh 
observes, a fee-shifting bylaw adopted by directors after public investors 
are already in place has several failings. As he points out, a bylaw 
unilaterally adopted by the board is not negotiated, nor is there a chance 
for investors to assess it and make an investment decision based on its 
presence.
189
 Accordingly, while unilaterally adopting a fee-shifting bylaw 
may be a valid exercise of corporate power, enforcing a unilaterally 
adopted bylaw may be a different matter.
190
  
For example, in Galaviz v. Berg,
191
 a federal court in California refused 
to enforce a unilaterally-adopted exclusive-forum bylaw. The court 
refused to enforce it, observing that a unilaterally adopted forum provision 
was inconsistent with the general understanding of contract law. The court 
said that “[u]nder contract law, a party’s consent to a written agreement 
may serve as consent to all the terms therein, whether or not all of them 
were specifically negotiated or even read, but it does not follow that a 
contracting party may thereafter unilaterally add or modify contractual 
provisions.”192  
Delaware law is admittedly broader than the holding in Galaviz. 
Delaware and other courts have rejected its approach, and held that once 
shareholders authorize the board of directors to “unilaterally adopt 
bylaws,” bylaws may be valid even though the board does not obtain the 
“contemporaneous” consent of shareholders.193  
 
 
 188. Pitt, supra note 136, at 26 (observing that failing to give shareholders proper notice of the 
board’s adoption of a fee-shifting bylaw may “undermine the valuable corporate purposes such 
provisions serve”).  
 189. Hamermesh, supra note 86, at 170–71.  
 190. See Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1357 (Del. 1985) (emphasizing that 
while directors were protected by the business judgment rule when adopting a poison pill, “[t]he 
ultimate response to an actual takeover bid must be judged by the Directors’ actions at that time”).  
 191. 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1174 (N.D. Cal. 2011). Notably, ATP upheld the facial validity of a 
bylaw against members who joined the company before the bylaw was adopted and agreed to be 
bound by bylaws set by the board afterward, bylaws that explicitly provided could be amended from 
time to time. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 560 (Del. 2014).  
 192. Galaviz, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 1174. Galaviz may be limited by its facts. In that case, the 
directors already breached their fiduciary duties by the time they adopted the forum-selection bylaw 
and the court emphasized that this fact was relevant to its decision. See id. at 1171 (noting that 
“[p]articularly where, as here, the bylaw was adopted by the very individuals who are named as 
defendants, and after the alleged wrongdoing took place, there is no element of mutual consent” 
necessary to enforce a forum-selection bylaw). Nevertheless, some law firms advise that fee-shifting 
bylaws stand a better chance of success if they are approved by shareholders. See, e.g., O’Keefe & 
Hsieh, supra note 121 (recommending that fee-shifting bylaws be ratified by shareholders). 
 193. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 956 (Del. Ch. 2013); see 
also Del. Cnty. Emps. Ret. Fund v. Portnoy, No. 13–10405–DJC, 2014 WL 1271528, at *12 (D. Mass. 
Mar. 26, 2014); Hemg Inc. v. Aspen Univ., No. 650457/13, 2013 WL 5958388, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Nov. 4, 2013). Other courts, however, have recognized that adopting a forum-selection bylaw on a 
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Yet even under Delaware law, fee-shifting bylaws cannot be applied to 
former shareholders or third parties—people who otherwise do not 
“consent” to such a provision, as illustrated by the recent decision in 
Strougo v. Hollander.
194
 In Strougo, the Delaware Chancery Court held 
that a fee-shifting bylaw adopted unilaterally that purported to apply to 
former shareholders could not apply to shareholders who stopped holding 
an equity stake in the company before that bylaw was adopted.
195
 The 
court explained that bylaws are like contracts between shareholders and 
managers, and once stockholders buy into the company, they also agree to 
the terms set forth in the company’s bylaws.196 But if the shareholder’s 
equity interest has been eliminated (either through sale or other means), 
then that shareholder is no longer part of that contract and terms changed 
afterward (such as adding a fee-shifting provision) do not apply.
197
 
The corollary of Strougo is that bylaws also cannot apply to persons 
who were never shareholders. The implication of this is that fee-shifting 
bylaws cannot apply to those who provide substantial assistance to 
investigating or pursuing the litigation. The universe of those who fall into 
the category of providing substantial assistance to an investigation or 
litigation is exceptionally broad. It may include not just the plaintiffs’ 
lawyer, but confidential witnesses, expert witnesses, private investigators, 
forensic accountants, and litigation financiers.
198
 In terms of the 
company’s fee shifting provision, while stockholders who hold stock at the 
time of the bylaw may be said to consent to the provision, parties who 
never own stock do not.
199
  
One is likely to respond that a difference between Rule 11 and fee-
shifting bylaws under ATP is that fee-shifting bylaws make the Rule 11 
inquiry mandatory upon dismissals of frivolous cases, making ATP’s 
species of fee-shifting more like the PSLRA and less like traditional Rule 
 
 
stormy day coupled with allegations that show this timing was improper would be sufficient reason not 
to enforce the bylaw. See, e.g., North v. McNamara, 47 F. Supp. 3d 635, 642–46 (S.D. Ohio 2014). 
 194. 111 A.3d 590 (Del. Ch. 2015).  
 195. Id. at 600. 
 196. Id. at 597–98. 
 197. Id. at 598. 
 198. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Fee-Shifting and the SEC: Does It Still Believe in Private 
Enforcement?, 53 BANK & CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REP. 10, 13 (2014) (stating that some bylaw 
provisions “are drafted so broadly that they expressly apply to ‘investigations’ as well as to legal 
actions, and some also purport to require anyone who assists a plaintiff in such litigation to also share 
liability for fee shifting,” which could include “a shareholder/whistleblower”).  
 199. See Strougo, 111 A.3d at 597–98; see also Am. Legacy Found. v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 831 
A.2d 335, 343 (Del. Ch. 2003) (stating that “only parties to a contract are bound by that contract”).  
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200
 Managers’ fiduciary obligations, again, likely preclude fee-shifting 
bylaws from operating in this manner. First, an automatic application of 
fee-shifting bylaws would mean that, in some instances, the provision 
would apply regardless of whether it was good or bad for the company. 
But under Delaware law, directors of companies cannot be contractually 
bound to violate their fiduciary duties.
201
 A fee-shifting bylaw—a form of 
contract, says ATP—that requires enforcement in all cases may, in some 
cases, require directors to enforce it where enforcing it would breach their 
fiduciary duties.  
Besides, if the board of directors does not have the ability to waive fee 
shifting, the board cannot exercise its business judgment to trade fee 
shifting for a reduced settlement.
202
 Others have characterized fee-shifting 
bylaws that do not contain a provision for board waiver as “reckless.”203 In 
fact, in Boilermakers, where then-Chancellor Strine upheld the facial 
validity of a forum-selection bylaw, the court observed with approval that 
the bylaw could be waived in a particular circumstance, serving as a 
control against misuse.
204
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
ATP was never a dramatic judicial endorsement of fee-shifting bylaws. 
Rather, the decision represents a traditional application of the Delaware 
Way. That Way provides a settled path for the judicial scrutiny of all board 
behavior. The decision to adopt or invoke any bylaw is an important part 
of the board’s obligation to manage the corporation. Delaware law 
 
 
 200. Under the PSLRA, findings on a parties’ compliance with Rule 11(b) are mandatory upon the 
final adjudication of a securities-fraud case, including when a case is dismissed with prejudice. 15 
U.S.C. § 78u-4(c)(1); see also DeMarco v. Depotech Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1187 (S.D. Cal. 
2001). 
 201. See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 936 (Del. 2003) (quoting 
Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 51 (Del. 1993)) (“‘To the extent that a 
[merger] contract, or a provision thereof, purports to require a board to act or not act in such a fashion 
as to limit the exercise of fiduciary duties, it is invalid and unenforceable.’”). 
 202. See, e.g., Pitt, supra note 136, at 29 (“The board should only adopt a by-law provision that 
permits the board to exercise its good faith business judgment to waive the provisions of the by-law 
whenever doing so would be conducive to securing a settlement of litigation.”). 
 203. Id. at 22, 25 n.14. 
 204. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 963 (Del. Ch. 2013); see 
also Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 40, at 366, 369 (stating that the ability to waive a forum-
selection bylaw “creates an option for the board later to act, consistent with its fiduciary duties, to 
petition a foreign court to dismiss the action in favor of proceedings in Delaware” and ensures that 
“[t]he board . . . always retains the discretion necessary to exercise its fiduciary obligations in 
connection with the decision of whether, when, where, how, and why to seek enforcement” of the 
forum-selection bylaw).  
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certainly grants the board a large reservoir of authority to manage the 
corporation, but in cases of inherent conflicts, it also demands careful 
judicial examination of board actions to ensure that those actions satisfy 
the board’s equitable and fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. In particular, 
the board’s decision to adopt or to invoke a fee-shifting bylaw—or any 
bylaw that raises the similar specter of self-interest—must be enjoined 
where that decision constitutes an improper purpose or is otherwise 
inequitable under the circumstances.  
The Delaware Way requires particularly exacting judicial scrutiny of 
fee-shifting bylaws, under which most of these fee-shifting bylaws will not 
survive. Under ATP and the Delaware Way, as properly understood and 
followed by courts relying upon Delaware corporate law, the only fee-
shifting bylaws that will survive equitable review are those that shift 
reasonable fees to the other party (be they plaintiffs or defendants) in cases 
of frivolous lawsuits or litigation tactics. Accordingly, the only fee-
shifting bylaws that would have survived the equitable case-by-case 
scrutiny of the Delaware courts are those that simply mirror the inquiry 
already required by Delaware Rule 11. By overturning ATP legislatively, 
the Delaware legislature spared Delaware litigants and the system the 
lengthy decision-by-decision, common-law process.  
Those states that look to Delaware law to guide them in their approach 
to fee-shifting bylaws have a choice to make. The courts in those states 
can follow the Delaware Way and impose, case by case, significant 
equitable limits on adopting or invoking fee-shifting bylaws. Over time, 
those decisions will preclude the use of any fee-shifting bylaw that does 
not mirror the state’s version of Rule 11. In the end, however, do those 
states really want to spend the next several years—litigating, incurring 
costs for defendants, plaintiffs, and the courts—getting to a world that 
already exists? On the other hand, those states can follow the Delaware 
legislature’s lead and render fee-shifting bylaws facially invalid.  
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